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Abstract
HOT AND BOTHERED: THE ROLE OF AROUSAL AND REJECTION SENSITIVITY IN
DUAL PROCESS SEXUAL DECISION MAKING FOR GAY AND BISEXUAL MEN
by
H. Jonathon Rendina
Advisors: Professors Sarit A. Golub and Jeffrey T. Parsons
Dual process theories of decision making acknowledge the functioning of two distinct yet
simultaneous processes termed System 1 and System 2. While System 1 relies more heavily on
automatic and affective processing, System 2 relies more heavily on effortful and cognitive
processing. Over the past several decades, many lines of research have shown the importance of
System 1 in decision making and several prominent social psychological theories of
interpersonal behavior, such as rejection sensitivity, rely on this dual distinction between
affective and cognitive processing. Despite the prominence of dual process theories in many
areas of psychology, the role of System 1 has been largely absent from psychological inquiries
into sexual decision making. As such, the aims of this dissertation were to: (1) investigate a dual
process model of sexual decision making by incorporating the role of anxious and sexual arousal
into a model with known System 2 predictors of sexual behavior; and (2) examine whether
rejection sensitivity as a dispositional trait can be applied to condom use as a behavior and
whether it acts upon condom use via interactions within the dual process framework investigated
within the first aim.
To achieve these aims, data were collected as part of a larger, longitudinal study of highly
sexually active gay and bisexual men in New York City. As part of the project, men completed a
one-hour survey from home (i.e., computer-assisted survey interviewing or CASI) as part of their
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12-month longitudinal follow-up appointment and subsequently completed a 30-day online daily
diary of their affect and sexual behavior. Using multilevel modeling, I tested a series of
hypotheses regarding the role of anxious arousal (within-person), sexual arousal (within-person),
perceived behavioral control (within-person), safer sex self-efficacy (between-person), and
condom-related rejection sensitivity (between-person) on daily engagement in unprotected anal
intercourse with casual male partners.
Across models, results supported several of the hypotheses from the first aim. Although
anxious arousal was not found to be associated with engagement in UAI, sexual arousal was
significantly positively associated with UAI, as hypothesized. Similarly, perceived behavioral
control and safer sex self-efficacy were both shown to be negatively associated with engaging in
UAI. Results did not support the hypothesis that System 1 (i.e., sexual arousal) and System 2
(i.e., behavioral control) processing interact in their influence on UAI, but rather that System 1
biases System 2 processing as demonstrated through a mediational analysis. Building upon these
analyses, several of the hypotheses from the second aim were also confirmed. Condom-related
rejection sensitivity was found to be significantly and positively associated with engaging in UAI
as well as with higher levels of anxious arousal on a given day. Examining potential mechanisms
of the association between rejection sensitivity and UAI, results revealed significant interactions
between rejection sensitivity and self-efficacy as well as rejection sensitivity and sexual arousal.
Taken together, findings suggest that rejection sensitivity may ameliorate the protective effect of
self-efficacy on UAI and heighten the risk for UAI influenced by sexual arousal. The theoretical
and public health implications of the findings and directions for future research are discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
People are faced with decisions on an almost constant basis, from the easiest “no
brainers” to those which can be life-altering and may rely on a variety of strategies to arrive at a
final choice. Decision making is a mental process in which people who are faced with two or
more options arrive at a choice of which to pursue (VandenBos, 2007). Not surprisingly, given
the frequency with which people are confronted with choices to make, much of the work
underlying decision making occurs without conscious awareness or effort. The notions of
“listening to your heart,” “passion versus reason,” and “feeling torn” between the heart and the
mind are all common images in popular culture. These dualistic notions were also prominent in
many early philosophical theories regarding the role of feelings and thinking in explaining
human behavior. Beliefs regarding the role of impulse and feelings versus rational control and
logical thought in human behavior have predominated popular images of decision making across
many historical and current societies. Despite commonplace and early philosophical notions of
feelings having strong influence over behavior, psychological theories of decision making have
not, until recently, taken feelings into account.
Though the early psychological work done by Freud (1901, 1920) and other
psychoanalysts acknowledged the role of affect and unconscious processes, much of the
psychological work done in the 20th century ignored such modes of thinking. The behaviorist
movement could be said to have intentionally ignored decision making altogether, focusing
instead on how reinforcements led to learned associations which caused behaviors (e.g., Skinner,
1953). Later researchers in cognitive psychology sought to give agency back to the individual
decision-maker and focused on the role of thoughts in leading to behaviors (c.f., Miller, 2003),
though this work continued to ignore the influence of feelings and implicit or nonconscious
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processes on behavior. Despite an overwhelming lack of research on affective and unconscious
processes in decision making until recently, the pioneering work of Zajonc (1980b, 1984) gave
credence to the notion that affective processing can occur without intervening cognitive
influence and set the stage for what would later become theories of the mind.
More than three decades after the work of Zajonc, it is now well accepted by many
psychologists as well as neuroscientists that mental tasks such as problem-solving, learning,
attitude formation, social cognition, and decision making are guided by two simultaneous
processes within the brain. These modes of processing can be distinguished in several ways,
including being automatic versus controlled, intuitive versus reasoned, affective versus
cognitive, and ‘hot’ versus ‘cool’ (Barrouillet, 2011b; Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; Chaiken &
Trope, 1999; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Evans, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick,
2002; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Stanovich
& West, 2000; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Zajonc, 1980a,
1980b). Theories that investigate and describe the operation of these two modes of thought are
often called dual process theories. Dual process theories are used to investigate many mental
phenomena, including memory (e.g., Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004), learning (e.g., Evans,
2011; Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005), and reasoning (e.g., Evans, 2011), and each focuses on
certain distinctions between the two systems. The exact description of each of the two processes
differs, but Stanovich (1999) synthesized the literature by identifying commonalities across their
usage and subsequently labeled them System 1 and System 2.
Within the literature on dual process decision making, Systems 1 and 2 are distinguished
by having opposite or qualitatively distinct elements of perception, processing, and purpose
(Evans, 2011; Stanovich, 1999). System 1 is evolutionarily older and common to many animals;
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it operates quickly and efficiently, occurs implicitly (or unconsciously), is qualitative in nature,
relies heavily on feelings, affect, experience, and heuristics, and has stereotypically been
considered a “lower”-order process. System 2 is evolutionarily recent and generally considered
unique to human thought; it operates more slowly and requires effort, occurs explicitly (or
consciously), is quantitative in nature, relies heavily on mathematical processing, logic, reason,
and rationality, and has typically been considered a “higher”-order process (Barrouillet, 2011a;
Frankish, 2010; Sloman, 1996; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). Though the exact
distinctions made between the two systems depends upon a variety of factors (e.g., the type of
processing being investigated, the specific researcher’s theoretical orientation, the research
question being asked), some distinctions are more common than others.
One of the primary distinctions made regarding Systems 1 and 2 in dual process theories
of decision making has to do with the extent to which they operate based on affect and intuition
versus cognition and reasoning. The type of processing that occurs within System 1 has been
deemed “hot” by some as a result of the role of affect and emotions in biasing its outcomes, and
thus the processing within System 2 is sometimes called “cool” (Abelson, 1963; Janis & Mann,
1977; Lepper, 1994; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Redlawsk, 2002). While this “hot/cool”
dichotomy is often used to describe distinctions between affective and cognitive processing,
some researchers use it to distinguish between two types of cognition (i.e., System 2 processes)
—one that is influenced by affect and one that is not (i.e., “hot” and “cold” cognition). Similarly,
some researchers consider the processing that occurs in both Systems 1 and 2 to be cognitive,
with the two systems employing qualitatively distinct types of cognition. Despite these
inconsistencies in the distinctions drawn between “hot” and “cool” processes or Systems 1 and 2,
it is common to assume that System 1 relies directly on affect while System 2, to the extent it
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utilizes affect, does so only indirectly through its interaction with System 1 (Barrouillet, 2011b;
Epstein, 1994). Ongoing debates regarding the exact nature of each system notwithstanding (e.g.,
Samuels, 2009), the purpose of the present study is to apply these existing paradigms to a new
area of inquiry rather than explore or validate the distinctions among cognitions and affect or
between hot and cool processes. As such, the primary distinction I will make between the two
systems is that of hot or feelings-based (i.e., System 1) versus cool or thinking/planning-based
(i.e., System 2) processing.
Dual process models offer unique perspectives on the role that these two systems and
thus, thoughts and feelings, play in decision making. Dual process models provide predictions
about the conditions under which decisions are likely to coincide with long-term, cost-benefit
based thinking versus more short-term or seemingly “irrational” thinking. Under typical
conditions, Systems 1 and 2 work together—affectively tagged memories may help to speed up
the process through which a person can determine whether a given option would lead to a
beneficial or harmful outcome (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007). The brain is in a
constant feedback loop with the body and, as such, bodily states can lead to affective cues that
similarly hasten the rate at which people are able to arrive at beneficial decisions (Damasio,
1994, 2001). However, under times of risk, uncertainty, or conflict, the two processes can
conflict by causing a shift in focus from long-term goals to attending to immediate threats and
interests. In these situations, System 1 processing—being more rapid, evolutionarily older, and
feelings-based—often dominates decision making and operates based on instinctive processes
such as threat-avoidance or pleasure-seeking. The dominance of System 1 processing during
times of risk and conflict tends to lead to different and sometimes opposite decisions than would
have resulted from a more “cool-headed,” planned, and reason-based approach to decision
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making (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic et al., 2004). For example, in the
delay of gratification paradigm, Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) found that proximal and vivid
temptations lead individuals to seek immediate gratification even when delay of gratification
would have eventually led to receiving more of the tempting outcome. As such, dual process
theories have been used empirically to understand how and why individuals may make decisions
that seem to go against their best long-term interests in favor of options with short-term benefits
but long-term consequences.
Theories of decision making that focus on the reasons behind decisions that are
advantageous in the short-term but potentially risky in the long-term may be particularly
applicable to sexual behavior, in which short-term pursuits (e.g., pleasure, intimacy) are often
pursued despite potential for long-term consequences (e.g., susceptibility to infection and
pregnancy). Despite the widespread use of dual process models within several prominent
domains of decision making research, the literature on sexual behavior has yet to adopt a dual
process model for sexual decision making. Such a model may be particularly appropriate for sex,
given that sex is likely to be tied to affect, involves the body, and may be viewed as risky for
many individuals. Moreover, the sexual decisions people make are often viewed as “irrational”
in the empirical literature due to the fact that people regularly engage in behavior with negative
consequences such as unintended pregnancy and disease transmission. Given the uncertain
personal, interpersonal, and physical risk that accompanies sexual decisions, the role that affect
may play in guiding these decisions, the influence of bodily states during sex, and the need to
better understand how seemingly “irrational” behaviors may actually result from common forms
of decision making, dual process models may be aptly applied to the understanding of these
decisional processes and their relation to behavioral outcomes. As a result of these features of
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sexual behavior, dual process models are likely to be relevant for sexual decision making across
a variety of different sexual decisions and behaviors.
The task of sexual decision making could be viewed and studied in many ways—as the
process of deciding between alternatives in sexual initiation (i.e., engaging or not engaging),
sexual partnering (i.e., choosing among partners), or sexual risk-taking (i.e., level of sexual
safety to utilize). Each of these decisions is likely to be consequential to the individual making
them and may involve the criteria outlined above—being affect-laden, high in perceived risk,
involving bodily processes such as arousal, and having outcomes that may be viewed as
“irrational” in a typical cost-benefit analysis. Though choices regarding sexual initiation and
partnering may be precursors to sexual risk behavior, the actual behaviors that occur during sex
are the most significant with regards to potential for long-term consequences of decision making
(e.g., susceptibility to infection, pregnancy). Further, the literature on sexual behavior has tended
to focus primarily on the decisions regarding which specific sexual behaviors one will practice
(e.g., anal or vaginal sex without a condom), with much less focus on decisions regarding sexual
initiation and partnering (J. D. Fisher & Fisher, 2000). I will focus my analysis on investigating a
dual process model for understanding choices regarding sexual risk-taking (i.e., sex without a
condom) in order to build upon much of the prevailing literature regarding sexual decision
making.
Prominent models of decision making that have been used to understand sexual behavior
have typically relied on “rational” or cognitive decision making processes without considering
the role of affect (Albarracín et al., 2005). Despite their strong potential for helping explain
sexual decision making, dual process models have been applied to the investigation of sexual
risk behavior only once, as far as can be discerned from the literature (Ames, Grenard, & Stacy,
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2013). This study examined a dual process model among drug offenders that was based on the
social marker hypothesis, which I will discuss in detail in Chapter 2, and found that individuals
with impaired affective decision making were more prone to risky sexual behavior. Unlike this
study, the prominent theories of decision making in the sexual behavior literature utilize models
that can be thought of as focusing exclusively on the result of System 2 (i.e., cognitive or cool)
processing. Although these existing models have proven successful in predictions regarding
behavior (Johnson et al., 2002; Noar, 2008), their predictions are inconsistent and their effects
tend to range from small to moderate in magnitude. This suggests that these theories may warrant
novel modifications that incorporate the role of affective processing in order to improve their
utility. The leading models of sexual decision making have typically been developed in order to
understand sexual risk behavior in the context of the HIV epidemic as an attempt to inform
prevention efforts. The continuing spread of HIV and the increasing rates of transmission among
some groups (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012a, 2012b) suggest that new and
more powerful models are needed to better understand and curb the spread of the epidemic. Dual
process models may be one way to improve upon existing work on sexual behavior by
accounting for the role of both systems in sexual decision making, allowing for an understanding
of how affect and arousal may influence decisions about sexual risk behavior.
The role of psychological theory has been particularly prominent in HIV research since
its discovery in the 1980s. Despite important advances in biomedical prevention, psychological
and behavioral issues such as sexual risk behavior continue to be the largest obstacles in curbing
the growing HIV epidemic, particularly among gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with
men (Sullivan et al., 2009; Wolitski, Valdiserri, Denning, & Levine, 2001). Although HIV
prevention strategies to increase access to and use of condoms have proliferated, the ways in
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which people make decisions about condom use is still not well understood and has contributed
to the sustained growth of the HIV epidemic. More than 1 million people were estimated to be
living with HIV in 2010 and an estimated 47,500 were infected in that year alone (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2012a, 2012b, 2013). Among adolescents and adults in the
United States, at least 90% of the new HIV infections in 2011 were estimated to result from
sexual behavior alone (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013). Rates of non-condom
use remain high among both HIV-negative and HIV-positive men and women (Durham et al.,
2013; Reece et al., 2010; Rosenberger et al., 2012; Sanders et al., 2010; Teitelman, Tennille,
Bohinski, Jemmott, & Jemmott III, 2011). The sustained influence of behavioral factors in the
ongoing HIV epidemic highlights the need for psychological research to better understand
behavioral decision making and inform prevention efforts. Given the importance of condom use
in preventing the spread of HIV, psychological theories that better explain condom use behavior
by utilizing existing theories of decision making may contribute to a better psychological
understanding of sexual decision making while simultaneously making critical contributions to
helping curb the modern HIV epidemic.
Because prominent dual process models of decision making used within psychology have
yet to be applied to an understanding of sexual behavior, the goal of this dissertation is to
investigate an event-level model of sexual decision making that is informed by the literature on
dual processes in decision making. Utilizing existing theory and research, I will identify
variables that show promise for inclusion as System 1 and System 2 variables in a dual process
model. In doing so, I will propose and later test several hypotheses about the interaction of
Systems 1 and 2 in predicting sexual risk behavior (i.e., unprotected anal intercourse or UAI) and
examine both within-person fluctuations in behavior as well as individual differences in the role
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of these within-person processes on behavior. The primary goal of this dissertation is to examine
the utility of a dual process framework for understanding decisions regarding condom use.
Although HIV can be spread through any type of sex and to any type of person, HIV
disproportionately affects gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men (MSM) in the
U.S. epidemic. In fact, these men are the only subpopulation for whom rates of HIV incidence
continue to rise, with the number of new infections from male-to-male sexual contact increasing
despite decreasing numbers across all other transmission factors (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2012a). Although they comprise only a fraction of the total U.S. population
(approximately 2-5%), they accounted for nearly two-thirds of all new HIV infections in 2010
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012a). These disparities become even more
evident within urban centers such as New York City, where gay, bisexual, and other MSM have
more than 140 times the risk of contracting HIV and other sexually transmitted infections
compared with heterosexual males (Pathela et al., 2011). Moreover, these higher rates of
infection exist despite findings that gay, bisexual, and other MSM engaged in higher levels of
condom use and HIV testing. These findings suggest that disparities in infection for these men
may be at least partially attributable to higher levels of sexual activity, greater rates of HIV
seropositivity in their sexual networks, or the increased risk of HIV transmission during anal
intercourse. As a result of their high risk for HIV infection and transmission, I will conduct this
study using a sample of highly sexually active gay and bisexual men in New York City.
Within the chapters that follow, I provide the background and rationale for such an
analysis by first describing in more detail some prominent concepts from dual process theories of
decision making and the role of affect and arousal within these models. Next, I review the
prominent theories being used presently within the HIV risk literature and describe the current
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lack of affective variables within existing models of sexual decision making. I then describe the
need for an examination that encompasses not only within-person decision making processes but
also examines individual differences in sexual decision making. I end my review with a detailed
description of the aims of the proposed study before moving into a description of the
methodology for the proposed project.

11
Chapter 2: Dual Processes in Decision Making
There have been many waves of psychological theory that have attempted to take a new
and unique approach to the study of human behavior by studying the processes that contribute to
decision making. The psychoanalytic work of Freud attempted to explain much of human
behavior as an interplay between unconscious processes of the id, ego, and superego (Freud,
1920). Dissatisfied with these seemingly unobservable and unscientific pursuits, radical
behaviorism was popularized by the work of J. B. Watson (1913) and Skinner (1938, 1953) and
set out to explain behavior as being the result of reinforcement by external stimuli. Later
researchers again became dissatisfied with the focus on external stimuli and shifted their
investigations to the role of peoples’ cognitions in driving their behavior, giving way to the
cognitive revolution (Miller, 2003). Emotion had been studied and theorized about by early
psychologists such as Williams James (1884), who went as far as to suggest a complex interplay
between cognitive and affective processes (Lange & James, 1967/1885). However, this research
typically assumed that affective processing arose only as the result of cognitive processing and
thus could not occur prior to or independent of cognition. Most likely as a result of the
assumption that affect is not a measurable behavior or that it is a byproduct of cognition, the role
of affective processing in decision making received little attention until quite some time after the
behaviorist movement and cognitive revolution took place.
The prominent focus on affective processing in decision making is generally attributed to
the pioneering work of Zajonc (1980b, 1984) who examined the extent to which affective
processes can occur prior to and independently of cognitive processes and demonstrated that
“preferences need no inferences.” He hypothesized that affective responses are the first and
foremost human reaction to a stimulus, and that more effortful, cognitive processing occurs
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independently and, perhaps, less frequently than its affective counterpart. Based on his findings,
researchers began developing this notion into various hypotheses, theories, and models that
bestow upon affect a central role within information processing and decision making (e.g.,
Epstein, 1994). The primary theories that have developed from the work of Zajonc are known as
dual process models and focus on an evolutionarily older, rapid, automatic, affectively-based,
“hot,” “feeling” system (i.e., System 1) and an evolutionarily more recent, slower, effortful,
cognitively-based, “cool,” “thinking” system (i.e., System 2). Dual process models—as I will
describe below—have found support for Zajonc’s theory about the role that affect plays in
System 1 processing, as well as the role that affectively-based processing plays in assisting,
biasing, or thwarting the rationally-based processing of System 2.
As previously mentioned, System 1 is evolutionarily older and common to many animals;
it operates quickly and efficiently, occurs implicitly (or unconsciously) and automatically, is
qualitative in nature, relies heavily on feelings, affect, experience, and heuristics, utilizes “hot”
processing, and has stereotypically been considered a “lower”-order process. In contrast, System
2 is evolutionarily recent and generally considered unique to human thought; it operates more
slowly and requires effort, occurs explicitly (or consciously) and deliberatively, is quantitative in
nature, relies heavily on mathematical processing, logic, reason, and rationality, utilizes “cool”
processing, and has typically been considered a “higher”-order process (Barrouillet, 2011a;
Frankish, 2010; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Sloman, 1996; Slovic et al., 2004). The type of
processing that occurs within System 1 has been deemed “hot” cognition by some as a result of
the role of affect and emotions in biasing its outcomes, and thus the processing within System 2
is sometimes called “cool” (Lepper, 1994; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Redlawsk, 2002).
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One of the primary distinctions between Systems 1 and 2 is that System 1 involves the
body, making it the domain of affect and arousal and, thus, a “hot” system (e.g., Loewenstein &
O’Donoghue, 2007; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Although most researchers do not consider the
two systems to be the result of two discrete physical structures within the brain, the distinction
made among them is partially a result of evolutionary and neurological features (Loewenstein &
O’Donoghue, 2007). The emotional, “go” system was developed in early animals primarily for
the purposes of rapidly making so-called fight, flight, or freeze decisions when faced with a
threat (LeDoux, 1996). As such, the system relies on characteristics available to all animals—
somatic cues, affectively tagged memories, and automatic and non-conscious processing
(LeDoux, 1996). As the species developed and humans eventually evolved, the original brain
structures remained intact while newer brain structures were added, literally, above them
(LeDoux, 1996). As such, it is often the case that the evolutionarily older portions of the brain
remain active and used and newer portions of the brain have the ability to exert some form of
influence or control over the older systems.
In contrast to the quick, survival-based, affective processing of System 1, the cognitive
and deliberative component of System 2 typically utilizes the notion of a cost-benefit analysis to
weight long-term goals. The idea of a cost-benefit analyses developed from rational choice
theory and expected utility theory, both of which are prominent in many fields of social science,
particularly psychology, economics, and political science (Harless & Camerer, 1994; Monroe &
Maher, 1995; Riker, 1995). The main tenet of these theories is that people utilize a largely
conscious, logical decision making process in order to arrive at decisions that are of the utmost
benefit for themselves through what is termed a utility maximization procedure (Mongin, 1998).
When presented with multiple options, people engage in cost-benefit analysis to arrive at a single
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choice that is intended to maximize their benefit and minimize their loss (i.e., the choice with the
highest “expected utility”), taking into account both present and future consequences. The option
that achieves the maximum benefit and minimal loss over time is considered the most rational
choice, which is thought to be the choice that will be made (Mongin, 1998). Though System 1
processing is generally thought to be the primary mode of decision making as a result of its more
efficient, less effortful, and automatic nature, System 2 processing is thought to be able to
inhibit, interrupt, modify, or control System 1 (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2007).
The Role of System 1 Processing in Decision Making
The interaction between Systems 1 and 2 have been described differently within various
theoretical paradigms. Some theories consider System 1 to be a shortcut that helps to feed
information into System 2 (Slovic et al., 2007), whereas other theories describe the two systems
as competing for decisional control (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Regardless of the exact details, it
is generally agreed that the role of feelings in decision making is central. The importance of
affect for decision making is recognized in many dual process theories and has led to the
development of three related ideas about the interaction of affective and cognitive processes that
I discuss below.
First, Slovic and colleagues have developed the notion of an affect heuristic (Finucane,
Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic et al., 2004, 2007), which refers to a process in
which System 1 utilizes affectively-laden information to make split-second decisions. Slovic et
al. (2007) define the affect heuristic as:
representations of objects and events in people’s minds [that] are tagged to varying
degrees with affect. In the process of making a judgment or decision, people consult or
refer to an “affect pool” containing all the positive and negative tags consciously or
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unconsciously associated with the representations . . . affect may serve as a cue for many
important judgments. Using an overall, readily available affective impression can be far
easier—more efficient—than weighting the pros and cons or retrieving from memory
many relevant examples, especially when the required judgment or decision is complex
or mental resources are limited. This characterization of a mental short-cut leads to
labeling the use of affect a “heuristic.” (pp. 1335-1336)
Two features of the affect heuristic are worth noting. First, it is highly efficient, allowing for
split-second decisions which can occur in situations that are low in resources for logical or
drawn-out cognitive processing. Second, the affect heuristic relies on stored affectively-laden
memories, which range in valence from bad to good and differ in their relative strength or
salience. The affect heuristic suggests that feelings can hasten and complement rational (i.e.,
System 2) decision making by influencing cost-benefit analyses to focus on either the risks or
benefits of a decision based on whether it is associated with positive or negative feelings.
The affect heuristic was developed to explain how affect is used during decision making
processes and research to date has supported its main tenets. Finucane and colleagues (2000)
sought to better understand why an inverse association is often found between perceived risks
and benefits when, theoretically, the two should be positively correlated. The authors developed
the affect heuristic to explain this inverse association, showing that feelings regarding a certain
decisional target influence whether people focus either on its risks (i.e., resulting from negative
feelings) or benefits (i.e., resulting from positive feelings) and subsequently discount the other.
As such, feelings (i.e., System 1) lead to rapid cost-benefit analyses by influencing the cognitive
(i.e., System 2) processing of risks and benefits. Since that time, numerous studies have
supported this proposed role of affect in risky decision making. For example, one study found
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that adding a small loss to a gamble (versus a no-loss gamble) increased the attractiveness of the
gamble, suggesting that providing a small loss increased positive feelings towards the potential
gain and subsequently increased favorability of the gamble (Bateman, Dent, Peters, Slovic, &
Starmer, 2007). Other studies have shown that positive and negative feelings moderate the
association between perceived risks and support for policies to reduce those risks (Hine, Marks,
Nachreiner, Gifford, & Heath, 2007) and that external events that influence affect such as the
weather can change decision making, leading to such outcomes as increased stock market returns
on a given day (Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003). Taken together, findings support the role that
affect can play in speeding up cost-benefit analyses by biasing individuals towards focusing
more on costs or benefits based on their subjective feelings about the outcome.
Building upon some of the work on affect primacy by Zajonc (Zajonc, 1980b, 1984) and
the notion that affective System 1 processing can assist with deliberative System 2 processing
(Slovic et al., 2007; Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005), another theory describes how
bodily states can influence the role of affect in decision making. In the Somatic Marker
Hypothesis (SMH), Damasio (1994, 2001) proposes that affect may be so important for decision
making that people are unable to make personally advantageous decisions without an intact
affective or emotional processing system. The SMH suggests that, in many situations, an intact
affective processing system not only complements System 2-based rational decision making, but
that such affective processing is necessary to successfully execute cost-benefit analysis that
ultimately leads to decisions that are in one’s best interest. Through experiences with patients
with brain damage and later experiments with them and others, Damasio reported in his book on
the crippling role that losing emotion processing centers within the brain can have on rational
decision making. In his description, Damasio hypothesized and later confirmed with his own
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research that cognitive processes are inadequate for decision making in the face of difficult
decisions or conflict. In cases of difficult or conflict-laden decisions, people typically rely on an
unconscious awareness of psychophysiological phenomena (e.g., increased heart rate) to
generate affective cues to assist with more rapid decision making.
The underlying tenet of SMH is that the brain and body operate within a feedback loop in
which bodily (i.e., somatic) states provide cues to the brain about physiological arousal that
relates to the primary emotions (e.g., fear, sadness, happiness) and the brain similarly provides
signals to the body to activate cascades of somatic arousal that correspond to primary emotions.
These feelings are associated with experiences and thus provide automatic, “gut reactions” when
making decisions. These gut reactions can be thought of as the intuitive, automatic, and emotionbased (i.e., System 1) counterpart of the cost-benefit analysis (i.e., System 2) in rational actorbased theories—these reactions provide an immediate, qualitative feeling about the relative
goodness or badness of a potential option. Combined with the affect heuristic, this suggests that
bodily states may influence decision making by leading to positive or negative affect and
subsequently cuing decision making to focus on either benefits or risks of a specific decision.
Building on Damasio’s early work, several studies have shown that individuals with brain
damage are unable to utilize the somatic-affective link and thus have poorer decision making
(e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; Bechara et al., 2001; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio,
& Damasio, 1996). Other lines of research not focused on individuals with brain damage have
similarly found support for the SMH. Researchers have shown that individuals who have poor
physiological responses to risky decision making persist in making risky choices, despite
conscious awareness of the risk (Suzuki, Hirota, Takasawa, & Shigemasu, 2003). A similar study
demonstrated that the strength of autonomic afferent feedback (i.e., “gut feelings”) was
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correlated with success on a decision making task, indicating that the influence on decision
making is proportional to the strength of the bodily cues (Carter & Pasqualini, 2004). A third
study has found that false bodily feedback can also influence decision making, with individuals
tending to favor decisions that were randomly associated with strong indicators of bodily
response (e.g., false heart rate feedback; Batson, Engel, & Fridell, 1999). Taken together, these
studies suggest that bodily feedback leads to the generation of mental feelings which, in turn,
bias decision making.
Though the affect heuristic and the SMH assume that Systems 1 and 2 can be mutually
advantageous to each other, the third concept posits that, at least under certain conditions, the
two types of processing can conflict. Lowenstein and colleagues developed the notion of conflict
between the two systems in their risk as feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et
al., 2004). The basic tenet is that, under times of stress or risk, the simultaneous processing of
affect and cognition can lead to conflicts between the two, in which case the faster, more
automatic, and affectively-based System 1 will likely dominate. In contrast to rational actor
views of people as going through mental calculations of a cost-benefit ratio to arrive at a decision
that is of utmost benefit to them, this hypothesis relies on a notion similar to the affect heuristic
that people utilize affectively-based processing to make quick decisions. The risk as feelings
hypothesis builds upon other theories about the primacy of affect but diverges from them to
provide an understanding of how affect might thwart rather than complement cognitive
processing within risky decision making. The theory proposes that cognitive and affective
processing occur simultaneously and within a feedback loop and, much like the affect heuristic,
that affect predominates decision making. However, unlike the affect heuristic—in which affect
is seen as promoting rational decisions by simply allowing them to occur more rapidly and with
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less effort—the risk as feelings hypothesis proposes that conflicts can emerge within the
simultaneous processing of cognitive and affective systems during risky decision making. In the
context of these models, risky decisions are any in which outcomes are uncertain but
consequential. In cases of conflict, affective processing is utilized for making behavioral
decisions, which means that the behavioral outcome may be in conflict with the choice that
would have resulted from the more rational, cognitively-based system.
The competitive nature of affective (i.e., System 1) and cognitive (i.e., System 2)
processes under times of risk was highlighted in an article focusing on the ways in which
probability can influence decision making when making affect-poor versus affect-rich decisions.
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) showed that, compared to decisions when the outcome had little
impact on affect, decisions that pose affective risk are strongly influenced by probability of an
event. Specifically, immediate departures from impossibility (i.e., 0% probability) and certainty
(i.e., 100% probability) receive much more weight than do intermediate levels of probability.
The authors suggest that this results from the production of hope (resulting from an increase
from impossibility to slight possibility) or fear (resulting from a decrease from certainty to slight
uncertainty), which leads individuals to attend more strongly to these decisions. The heightened
sense of arousal or risk that results from slight departures from impossibility or certainty result in
stronger weight being placed on a decision than would have been if it were moderately probable
or remained impossible or certain. These findings suggest that decisions in which probability is
uncertain but high may produce fear and lead to affective processing aimed at decreasing
uncertainty of the potential outcome and that these short-term consequences would be weighted
more strongly than would be predicted by “rational” models of decision making (which assume a
focus on long-term risks and benefits).
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Dual Process Models in Social Psychology: Interactions between Personality and Context
As previously discussed, dual process models are utilized throughout many areas of
psychology, and are often used to describe processes of memory, learning, reasoning, and
decision making. Within the social psychological literature, dual process theories of decision
making often integrate social psychological theories and constructs that relate them more
strongly to interpersonal pursuits, social systems, and personality. As I describe below, one
prominent line of social psychological dual process models developed as a result of early work
by Mischel and colleagues (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel & Shoda, 1995).
Mischel and Shoda’s (1995) cognitive-affective personality system (CAPS) theory is a
prominent social psychological dual process decision making theory. The authors provided a
theoretical lens through which to understand the interaction of personality, context, and decision
making. More specifically, they proposed a theory to understand consistency and individual
differences in behavior in light of the fact that situational inconsistencies in behavior are also
present. They proposed that features of situations set in motion a series of cognitive and affective
processes that are based on prior experience. These cognitive-affective processes influence both
current personality as well as interpretations of the current situation. Their theory put forward the
notion that individuals have dispositional traits that lead to profiles of cognitive and affective
processing. These profiles, in turn, interact with the situation or context to produce behavior, thus
legitimizing the existence of both dispositions and situational variability. The CAPS theory led to
several important lines of theory and research that share a common idea about the ways in which
affective and cognitive processing can conflict and produce discrepancies between long-term
intentions and behavior and how social, personality, and contextual characteristics can influence
these discrepancies.
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Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) utilized the CAPS theory to develop a theory regarding hot
and cool processing and the delay of gratification. This dual process theory proposes that an
affective, reflexive, stimulus control, “go” system (i.e., System 1) coexists with a cognitive,
reflective, self-control, “know” system (i.e., System 2) and that the two systems have functional
differences and interact to produce behavior. Their theory proposed several conditions under
which the “cool control of hot impulses” (Metcalfe & Mischel, p. 8) is expected to fail. One such
condition is acute stress, with increasing levels of stress leading to increasing deficits in the
ability to utilize cool processing to temper hot processing. In many ways, this mirrors the notion
that System 1 dominates System 2 under times of risk within the risk as feelings hypothesis.
Another such condition that is similar to the first is that of a chronic environmental condition.
While acute stress is likely to be a situational factor, chronic environmental conditions are likely
to be precursors to dispositional traits or dispositional traits themselves. For example, one might
assume that chronic anxiety could lead to disruptions in cool processing as well as potentially
increasing acute levels of distress. Their theory predicts that the default human behavior is to
give in to temptation, which results from activation of the hot processing system. However, their
theory also predicts that thinking of the cool aspects of the situation will reduce the influence of
hot processing and lead to increases in the ability to delay gratification or otherwise engage in
behavioral control. For example, in a tempting situation, one might focus on the cool aspects
such as one’s intentions or the behavioral consequences rather than the hot aspects such as one’s
desires in order to engage in goal-directed behavior. This application of the CAPS to an
understanding of the delay of gratification paradigm provides meaningful predictions regarding
the interplay of personality and context as well as the interaction and outcomes of System 1 and
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System 2 processing. This interplay is central to several theories and models regarding the role of
personality, context, affect, and arousal on decision making.
Social psychological theories of decision making are particularly well-suited to
incorporate dispositional traits related to interpersonal functioning into models of how and why
people make the decisions they do when acting as agents in a social world. Applying the CAPS
theory and the notion of dispositional-situational interactions to a specific domain of personality,
Downey and Feldman (1996) developed the notion of rejection sensitivity to explain a trait that
can lead to different profiles of cognitive-affective processing. Rejection sensitivity is a
cognitive-affective processing disposition in which people chronically expect to be rejected and,
as a result, anxiously avoid the situations in which such expectations are activated. As a
dispositional trait, rejection sensitivity leads to certain profiles of cognitive and affective
processing such as hypervigilance and fear. As a result of this dispositional tendency towards
hypervigilance and fear, individuals perceive situations differently than others and subsequently
may engage in altered behaviors as a result of these processing differences. Further, these distinct
profiles of cognitive-affective processing and concomitant behavioral manifestations may lead to
cycles in which rejection actually becomes more likely and thus reinforces their dispositional
tendency to expect rejection. Thus, rejection sensitivity not only produces fear within
interpersonal situations, it leads individuals to process the situation differently and to seek
strategies to avoid rejection. Rejection sensitivity is a strong theory for better understanding the
ways in which interpersonal traits may influence how and why people make the decisions they
do within a variety of interpersonal decision making situations.
In addition to personality factors, Mischel and colleagues also described the importance
of contextual factors in influencing cognitive-affective processing. Such contextual factors can
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come in various forms, including both internal and external stimuli. Loewenstein and
O’Donoghue (2007) outlined several characteristics of environmental stimuli that can lead
affective processing to interfere with cognitive or deliberative processing as proposed in the risk
as feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al., 2001). They argue that several key characteristics of
the environment have strong influences on affective processing though relatively weak influence
on deliberative, cognitive processing. First, the temporal proximity of the stimulus (i.e., its
immediacy) is highly influential. Consequences that are temporally closer are likely to lead to
strong activation of the affective system. Similarly, non-temporal proximity such as physical
closeness can also lead to increases in affective processing and produce results inconsistent with
an individual’s intentions. Finally, the vividness of a stimulus, such as the ease and speed with
which it can be imagined or represented, increases affective processing. In fact, the authors base
much of this work on the work of Mischel reviewed previously. This work demonstrated that
specific contextual characteristics—proximity and vividness—that would increase affective
processing, lead to a focus on short-term rather than long-term outcomes, and interfere with the
long-term focus of System 2 (i.e., cognitive) processing.
Along with his work on decision making under affective conditions in general,
Loewenstein (1996) outlined several propositions about the role of arousal—an internal
stimulus—on decision making. As outlined in the paper, more intense levels of arousal are able
to produce greater discrepancies between intentions to act in one’s self-interest and actual
behavior while experiencing arousal. Similarly, when people imagine future decision making,
they give the influence of arousal significantly less weight in influencing a future decision than it
actually has at the moment of decision making. As such, the intensity of arousal may be directly
and inversely related to the extent to which people are able to act in accordance with their
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intentions versus their feelings. Proximal sources of arousal are also likely to produce an
appetitive response which can increase one’s levels of impulsivity. Further, people may tend to
overestimate their own confidence and skill in executing a behavior by underestimating the role
that arousal has played and will play in their making of decisions. In line with all of these
propositions, people are prone to discount the role that arousal will have on future behavior and
the role it has played in past behavior. These propositions regarding the impact of arousal on
decision making suggest that the role of intentions, self-interest, and self-efficacy in driving
decision making may be less than for decision making that occurs in domains without high levels
of arousal.
Taken together, the theoretical contributions of Mischel’s and Loewenstein’s work with
their colleagues on processes that lead to a focus on short rather than long-term consequences of
decision making suggest the notion of decisional myopia. Put another way, they provide
theoretical and empirical basis for conditions under which an individual’s intentions can be
thwarted in momentary decision making as a result of individual traits, the context in which the
decision is being made, and through the activation of affective or “hot” processing. Under
conditions in which there is a potential consequence that may occur at any moment, is nearby,
and can be vividly represented in the mind, levels of affective processing are likely to increase,
shifting focus from long-term to short-term thinking, and undermining the types of behaviors
individuals intend to engage in while in states not characterized by arousal or affective
processing (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2007). Loewnestein and O’Donoghue utilize the
example of food in their manuscript. For a typical individual, the presence of food may slightly
increase hunger which produces eating that is in line with both affective (i.e., hunger) and
cognitive (i.e., the need to eat) processing. However, for individuals on a diet, the temporal and
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physical proximity of food as well as the vividness with which they are able to imagine eating
the food is likely to increase affective processing (i.e., the feeling of hunger). This increase in
affect processing leads to a shift in focus from their long-term goal of losing weight to their
short-term goals of fulfilling their hunger and thereby thwarts cognitive processing. It is worth
noting that these effects occur only when affect and cognition have different motivations or
goals—increases in affective processing do not thwart deliberative or cognitive processing when
both affective and cognitive systems are attempting to achieve the same end (Loewenstein &
O’Donoghue). This line of research suggests that, when immediate states of emotion (e.g., anger,
fear), drive states (e.g., hunger, thirst), arousal (e.g., sexual, substance-induced), and others (e.g.,
pain, discomfort, nausea) are high, individuals will focus decision making on evaluating the
short-term consequences of these states rather than the long-term consequences of the outcome.
Several theories have suggested and demonstrated that affect and arousal can have direct
influences on decision making by leading to subsequent discrepancies between intentions and
behavior, generating increases in impulsivity, and interacting with dispositional, contextual, and
interpersonal processes. Individual characteristics such as stress, distress, and personality (e.g.,
rejection sensitivity) can lead to differential evaluation of situational stimuli (Downey &
Feldman, 1996; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Contextual and environmental stimuli and their
subsequent evaluations, in turn, can lead to increases in affective processing (Loewenstein, 1996;
Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2007; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). For
example, proximity of a perceived stimulus or the vividness with which it is imagined can
increase affective processing. When affective processing is focused on an immediate outcome or
consequence and cognitive processing is focused on long-term goals and intentions, the two are
in a state of conflict (Janis & Mann, 1977). Under such states of conflict, increases in affective
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processing induced by factors such as personality and situational cues are likely to lead to a state
of myopia, leading to behavior that is consistent with affective rather than cognitive processing.
Put another way, under various conditions (i.e., risk/conflict, heightened affect, proximity and
vividness of a decision object), it may be normative for individuals to act in ways that favor
short-term gains over long-term consequences (or minimizing short-term consequences over
maximizing long-term gains) despite this being inconsistent with traditional “rational” views of
decision making.
Summary
Throughout this chapter I have focused on several theories that lend support to the role of
feelings in decision making and the notion of decisional conflict or myopia. When considered
together, these theories provide testable hypotheses regarding the conditions under which such
processes and outcomes are likely to occur. For example, the affect heuristic suggests that
feelings are used to speed up the process through which decisions are made by biasing decision
making towards focusing on risks or benefits of an outcome; the SMH extended this by
incorporating the role that the body (i.e., “somatic markers”) plays in leading to these affective
feelings of “goodness” or “badness.” Proposing a similarly central role for affect and System 1
processing but describing the ways in which it can conflict with System 2 processing under times
of risk or conflict, the risk as feelings hypothesis provides an understanding of the ways in which
people can make decisions that are “illogical” or inconsistent with their goals and intentions.
Social psychologists have utilized similar theories of cognitive-affective processing or
“hot”/”cool” processes to explain how characteristics such as proximity and vividness can cause
difficulties with acting in one’s best interest (e.g., delaying gratification) and this has been
applied to interpersonal processes within the rejection sensitivity literature. Finally, I reviewed
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theories about the role of arousal on decision making and demonstrated that arousal—combined
with contextual features and feelings of risk—can lead to unanticipated decisions and an inability
to recognize the role arousal has played or will play in past and future decisions. I proposed that
these theories, taken together, provide support for the notion that individuals may develop a
sense of decisional myopia under conditions of high affect, perceived risk or uncertainty, and
arousal, and that this may lead to some of the inconsistencies observed in individuals’ intentions
and behaviors. However, my focus throughout this review has been on decision making in
general. In the next chapter, I begin by reviewing the current state of the sexual decision making
literature followed by a review of the existing empirical work regarding the role of affect and
arousal in sexual decision making, specifically.
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Chapter 3: Research on Sexual Decision Making
In order to better develop a new model of event-level sexual decision making that
incorporates both affective and cognitive components, it is important to understand what models
are currently being used, how successful they have been, and which variables have proven most
effective for understanding sexual decision making thus far. Researchers conducting work on
HIV prevention have utilized several theoretical models to understand the processes that lead to
sexual risk behavior in order to subsequently intervene on these processes and reduce HIV risk.
According to meta-analytic and review work (Albarracín et al., 2005; Noar, 2007), the most
widely used theories to explain sexual decision making in the HIV literature are: the theories of
reasoned action and planned behavior (TPB; Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein, 1990; Fishbein &
Middlestadt, 1989; Montaño & Kasprzyk, 2002), the health belief model (HBM; Janz,
Champion, & Strecher, 2002), social cognitive theory (SCT; Bandura, 1976, 1989, 2001), and
the information-motivation-behavioral skills model (IMB; J. D. Fisher & Fisher, 1992; J. D.
Fisher, Fisher, Misovich, Kimble, & Malloy, 1996; J. D. Fisher, Fisher, Williams, & Malloy,
1994; W. A. Fisher, Williams, Fisher, & Malloy, 1999). As I review below, this research has had
some success, but inconsistencies in the utility of these theories may stem from several
limitations including what has typically been a narrow focus on cognitive antecedents of
behavior without attention to the role of affect (Albarracín et al., 2005) and a focus on crosssectional and aggregated sexual behavior data rather than longitudinal models that account for
within-person variation (J. D. Fisher & Fisher, 2000).
Sharing common roots in the expected utility and rational actor theories discussed
previously that rely heavily on System 2 processing, these models utilize cognitive components
that were picked to be applicable to health behavior and sexual risk behavior, specifically. Given
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their shared roots, each model includes behavioral expectancies—i.e., beliefs about the costs and
benefits of engaging in a behavior—as a core component. In addition to behavioral expectancies,
which are common across all four theories, one other common element is Bandura’s (1976,
1989, 2001) notion of self-efficacy. Self-efficacy refers to the extent to which people believe that
they are able to perform a given behavior in order to produce a given outcome (Bandura, 1977).
Both behavioral expectancies and self-efficacy are inherently a result of System 2 processing, as
both rely primarily on beliefs which stem from the cool/thinking rather than hot/feeling system.
In addition to beliefs regarding the benefits and costs of a given behavior, a person’s belief that
she or he can successfully perform the behavior is a second consideration when making
behavioral decisions and is considered to be one of the primary influences on outcome
expectancies in SCT. To the extent that a person believes she or he is unable to perform a
behavior with competence, the likelihood that she or he will intend to or actually perform the
behavior becomes lower. Each of these theories shares the two common elements of SCT,
expectancies and self-efficacy, and will be referred to as SCT-based theories herein. In addition
to sharing the common elements of SCT, each of the four models has its own unique components
and history of empirical research.
The theory of reasoned action is well known for considering behavioral intentions to be
the only direct antecedent of behavior itself, though the TPB added perceived behavioral control
(i.e., self-efficacy) as a second direct predictor (Ajzen, 1991). Behavioral intentions arise as a
result of explicit (i.e., System 2) attitudes towards the behavior and social norms about the
behavior, as well as being thought to be at least partially attributable to self-efficacy. Thus, the
two direct antecedents of behavior in the TPB are behavioral intentions and self-efficacy which
are both explicitly a result of System 2 processing. One of the primary limitations of this theory
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is that it considers two relatively stable and entirely cognitive variables to fully account for the
complexity of human sexual behavior.
Despite relying exclusively on System 2 decision making processes, researchers over the
past three decades have demonstrated modest findings using the TPB to predict behaviors such
as condom use. For example, several meta-analyses of the theory and its association with
condom use have found support for each component of the model (Albarracín, Johnson,
Fishbein, & Muellerleile, 2001; Sheeran & Orbell, 1998; Sheeran & Taylor, 1999), with average
effect sizes in the modest to moderate (i.e., effect sizes of .20 to .60) range. Albarracín and
colleagues (2001) found support for the model across 96 studies with heterogeneous samples. As
suggested by the theory, subjective norms, attitudes, and perceived behavioral control all
predicted intentions to use condoms, and intentions to use condoms had a direct effect on future
condom use. However, the meta-analysis revealed stronger associations between intentions and
behavior when assessing behavior retrospectively rather than prospectively, suggesting people
may have based their intentions at least partially on prior behavior. Not surprisingly, the authors
also found significant heterogeneity in the associations between TPB variables and sexual
behavior outcomes across studies. These findings demonstrate the breadth of the theory’s use
while also highlighting the considerable amount of variability that is unexplained by the model
as it currently exists.
As its name suggests, the Health Belief Model is a model whose core components are a
person’s beliefs about a given health behavior and has been called a model of conscious decision
making (J. D. Fisher & Fisher, 2000). The four primary beliefs on which the model focuses are:
a) a person’s perceived benefits of performing the behavior, b) perceived barriers to performing
the behavior, c) perceived susceptibility to the condition the behavior prevents, and d) perceived
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severity of the condition the behavior prevents. In addition to these four beliefs, the model
focuses on a person’s self-efficacy to engage in the behavior. The first two of the beliefs—
perceived benefits and perceived barriers—have to do with the traditional cost-benefit analysis
(i.e., System 2) from expected utility theory. Perceived susceptibility and severity are
collectively known as perceived threat and have to do with the perceived odds of a behavior
leading to a health condition and how serious the health condition would be, respectively. Unlike
measuring the extent to which a person feels positively or negatively about a behavior (i.e.,
qualitative, System 1 processing), perceived threat relies on an objective assessment of the odds
(i.e., quantitative, System 2 processing) of a certain outcome. A meta-analysis conducted two
decades ago of studies that were deemed to have measured all components of the HBM found
only 16, and results suggested the 16 studies had significant heterogeneity in their effects
(Harrison, Mullen, & Green, 1992). Furthermore, the standard cost-benefit variables fared better
than the more unique perceived threat variables, and this finding was confirmed in a recent metaanalysis conducted on 18 studies (Carpenter, 2010). However, neither of these studies was
exclusive to HIV risk behavior and no such analysis appears to have been conducted to date.
This suggests that, to the extent the HBM has been used to study sexual behavior, research has
been conducted by selecting components in a piecemeal fashion rather than being consistently
tested as a model of decision making and results regarding its utility have been equivocal (J. D.
Fisher & Fisher, 2000). Results indicate that the additional cognitive components of the HBM
may improve very little upon the basic cost-benefit analysis that often forms the core component
of System 2 processing.
In developing the IMB model, J.D. Fisher and Fisher (1992) synthesized the existing HIV
prevention literature and determined that HIV risk behavior change was the result of three
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fundamental antecedents—possessing information regarding HIV, its transmission, and how to
prevent it; having a personal sense of motivation to prevent one’s own acquisition of HIV
through behavior change or maintenance; and having the behavioral skills necessary to enact
such changes. The IMB model shares much in common with the elements of TPB and, like the
TPB, the IMB model relies exclusively on System 2 processes to predict behavior. For example,
although motivation might be thought to be at least partially feelings-based, the definition of
motivation in the IMB is quite similar to that of intention within the TPB. Behavioral skills
within the IMB model involve both having a sense of self-efficacy for performing the behavior
as well as objectively possessing the specific skills necessary to perform the behavior, both of
which result from cognitive, System 2 processing. Unlike the TPB, the IMB model specifies that
behavioral skills result from having adequate information and motivation, with all three having
direct effects on behavior itself. All three of the IMB constructs have been supported by research
specifically on HIV risk behavior, demonstrating both through model-based testing of structural
relationships and through mechanisms of change in intervention research that information,
motivation, and behavioral skills are all associated with sexual behavior (J. D. Fisher & Fisher,
2000; J. D. Fisher, Fisher, & Shuper, 2009). Although it has been one of the most successful
models of sexual decision making, the IMB model, like the others reviewed, has substantial
room for improvements that take into account variables that may interfere with the motivational
and informational components and reduce their impact on behavior.
Overall, nearly three decades of research have led to promising but modest and
inconsistent results using SCT-based theories to inform basic and prevention research for gay
and bisexual men (Johnson et al., 2002). Several large meta-analyses conclude that these theories
lead to successful theory-based interventions, and that key components of them such as self-
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efficacy and behavioral skills predict behavior and can be intervened upon to enact behavior
change (see Noar, 2008 for a review). However, findings suggest that there is also significant
room for improvement with these models, with effect sizes still in the small to modest range. For
example, although the TPB is the most widely used and has demonstrated efficacy, crosssectional associations between TPB variables and behavioral outcomes tend to be moderate and
research on the predictions of these models using prospective (Albarracín et al., 2001) or
longitudinal data (Huebner, Neilands, Rebchook, & Kegeles, 2011) has shown them to perform
less well. These mixed results are potential artifacts of two primary characteristics of this
literature that likely result from a limited amount of collaboration between decision making
researchers (who use dual process theories but do not study sex) and those studying sexual
behavior (who study sex but do not use dual process theories). First, as has been discussed at
length, these models typically account for only System 2 processing and may be neglecting the
added predictive power that might be added by examining System 1 processes such as affect and
arousal. Second, these models and the research that has been used to test them have typically
explained behaviors—which occur across a series of contexts and times—using aggregated data
about them. In doing so, the role of intraindividual variability and momentary influences on
decision making are often left out in favor of dispositional traits and presumed behavioral
consistency. Although these models provided a critical first step in gaining a better
understanding of sexual decision making, their utility is likely to be substantially increased by
incorporating research on decision making that has been done outside of the literature on sexual
behavior.
In order to improve upon these models, it may be most effective to retain their best
features as components of System 2 processing and adapt them within a dual process framework
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by incorporating the role of System 1 processing. A detailed meta-analysis of the HIV prevention
literature provides insight as to which specific components of these various theories might be the
most promising for influencing sexual decision making (Albarracín, Durantini, & Earl, 2006).
The study examined 194 separate manuscripts reporting on more than 446 different datasets from
theory-based HIV prevention interventions. Across all of the theories reviewed above, the
authors found strong support for attitudes, self-efficacy, and behavioral skills, fair support for the
role of social norms, and poor support for the role of perceived threat. When examining samples
of gay, bisexual, and other MSM, the attitudinal component of these SCT-based theories was less
effective than the others just described and self-efficacy was believed to be one of the largest
factors that influence the behavior of gay, bisexual, and other MSM. Summarizing their results,
the authors note, “people are unlikely to change unless they want to, believe they can, feel they
will, and have the behavioral skills to actually change” (p. 879).
In sum, the SCT-based models of sexual decision making have been partially effective,
particularly when considering the specific role of self-efficacy and its related constructs (i.e.,
perceived behavioral control and behavioral skills), but their success has been mixed and has
varied widely across methods of assessment and populations of interest. These mixed results are
most likely a result of the fact that the models assume that decision making arises strictly from
rational, cognitive processing that is relatively stable over time. Core components of the models
such as intentions, beliefs, and information explicitly leave out the reality that affect and arousal
play during sexual situations. Moreover, because these core components are thought to be
relatively stable, there is little room for explaining variability in sexual behavior that naturally
occurs. While stable predictors may be useful for determining types of people who do and do not
ever engage in certain behaviors (e.g., unprotected sex), they are unlikely to provide substantial
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insight into the processes that occur over time that lead individuals to engage in condom use at
some times and not at others. Although some individual can be differentiated in such ways due to
highly consistent behavior, this is unlikely to be the norm (Cooper, 2010). In order to more fully
account for the true influences on sexual decision making and behaviors, more data are needed
that examine not only individual differences in decision making but also the within-person
processes that more directly account for such fluctuations in behavior over time. In doing so,
researchers can account for those between-person factors—such as those successfully identified
in the wealth of sexual behavior research to date—that either directly influence behavioral
outcomes or influence behavior through their influence on within-person fluctuations in decision
making processes. In the section below, I describe existing evidence regarding the role of affect
and arousal in sexual decision making. In the chapter that follows, I consider the issue of
between- and within-person effects and their role in sexual decision making.
Research on Affect and Sexual Decision Making
Exploratory research investigating associations between System 1 (i.e., affective)
processes and sexual behavior has been conducted, though it has not typically been done using
theories of decision making. One meta-analysis conducted more than ten years ago examined 34
different studies that included an examination of the relationship between negative mood and
sexual behavior and found mixed results (Crepaz & Marks, 2001). The study found that there
was significant variability in both the magnitude and the sign of the association between negative
mood and behavior. While some studies found significant positive associations, others found
significant negative associations and the overall effect size across studies was not significantly
different from zero. Specifically, the authors focused on two forms of negative mood—anxious
and depressive symptoms. The authors found that the weighted average of the two types of
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negative mood did not significantly predict sexual behavior nor did they differ significantly in
their effects on sexual behaviors. The authors concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to
establish that negative mood was associated with sexual risk behavior, though they found
evidence of a trend whereby negative mood was more predictive of sexual behavior for gay,
bisexual, and other MSM than for other samples. Although this meta-analysis provided a useful
synthesis of the extent to which affective processes have been included in research on sexual
behavior to date, the studies included had a variety of limitations.
Most if not all of the studies reviewed in the meta-analysis investigated mood. While
mood certainly warrants investigation, it is considered a long-lasting predisposition towards
certain forms of emoting or affect rather than the momentary experience of feeling that is
available to influence a specific decision. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV-TR)
of the American Psychiatric Association (2000) defines mood and distinguishes it from affect:
[Mood is] a pervasive and sustained emotion that colors the perception of the world.
Common examples of mood include depression, elation, anger, and anxiety. In contrast to
affect, which refers to more fluctuating changes in emotional “weather,” mood refers to a
more pervasive and sustained emotional “climate.” (p. 825)
In a response to the meta-analysis, Kalichman and Weinhardt (2001) describe several limitations
of the studies that Crepaz and Marks reviewed. Prominent among these limitations were
concerns that the studies relied on global mood assessments rather than the role of affect at the
time of sexual behavior as well as being overwhelmingly cross-sectional. Though some have
used affect as an umbrella term encompassing mood, emotion, and feeling, I utilize affect and
feeling interchangeably to describe a momentary state or experience of either basic emotion or
more general, transient feeling states (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). I contrast affect and feelings with
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mood, which is a tendency, predisposition, or aggregated experience of affective or feeling states
that typically has no specific trigger or referent and are of more substantial duration (Schwarz &
Clore, 2007; VandenBos, 2007). As such, I presume that affect is more specific and fleeting than
mood but less specific than discrete emotions. As mentioned previously, constructs that are able
to fluctuate momentarily may pose more potential for explaining intraindividual variation in
behavior over time than would a long-lasting, dispositional construct such as mood.
Despite the lack of findings for negative mood and, more specifically, anxiety, research
looking at the association of state levels of affect and sexual behavior has revealed different
results. A small but significant body of literature has begun to develop regarding the association
of fluctuating levels of affect with intraindividual variability in sexual behavior by using
methodologies such as daily diary research. Studies that have involved an assessment of specific,
fluctuating affect have found them to influence sexual decisions made on an event-level basis
(Fortenberry et al., 2005; Grov, Golub, Mustanski, & Parsons, 2010; Mustanski, 2004, 2007;
Shrier, Shih, & Beardslee, 2005). Grov et al. (2010) found that, among highly sexually active
gay and bisexual men, daily negative affect reduced the risk of unprotected anal sex on a given
day. On days when men felt higher levels of negative affect, they had lower odds of engaging in
unprotected sex than on days when they had lower levels of negative affect. Mustanski (2007)
investigated the role of anxious, negative, and positive affect on a composite variable of sexual
risk behavior within a diary study of MSM. Utilizing both trait and state measures of anxious
affect, he found that increases in state anxiety (i.e., within-person fluctuations) were associated
with increases in risk while increases in trait anxiety (i.e., between-person differences) were not
associated. These findings suggest that dual process models of sexual decision making that
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incorporate the role of anxious affect at the event level (i.e., within-person) may provide
promising results, particularly among gay, bisexual, and other MSM.
Research on Arousal and Sexual Decision Making
Research has demonstrated that sexual arousal can influence sexual decision making. One
early study demonstrated an association between sexual arousal and condom use, showing that
higher levels of sexual arousal at the initiation of sex were associated with less usage of condoms
(Boldero, Moore, & Rosenthal, 1992). Following that, several experimental studies have shown
the impact that arousal can have on sexual decision making. Blanton and Gerrard (1997)
recruited a sample of male undergraduates and randomized them to receive an image of a woman
rated to be of high or low sex appeal. Men who viewed images of the women with high sex
appeal discounted the level of risk she posed for sexually transmitted infections as well as the
need to use condoms with her. This study demonstrated that sexual arousal may influence the
cognitive processing of risk estimates. It is possible that arousal influences sexual decision
making in one of two ways: arousal may directly influence cognition by altering risk perceptions,
or arousal may interact with cognition, thwarting cognitive processing and thereby reducing the
ability to access and utilize accurate estimates.
Support for the hypothesis that arousal thwarts cognition rather than being mediated by
changes in cognition was partially supported by another study. Loewenstein, Nagin, and
Paternoster (1997) investigated whether sexual arousal would influence men’s willingness to
engage in sexual aggression. They confirmed their hypothesis that men who were sexually
aroused were subsequently more willing to engage in forceful and coercive means to achieve
sex. However, the authors also hypothesized that these effects would be mediated by changes in
the perceived costs and benefits of engaging in such behaviors. Although costs and benefits were
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related to behavior, the authors found no support for the notion that the influence of sexual
arousal on behavior was mediated by changes in perceived costs and benefits. Further, the
authors also found no support for the notion that arousal was mediated by other cognitive
variables. Though the authors had insufficient power which prevented them from testing
interactions between arousal and cognitions, this study suggests that arousal is not mediated by
cognition and leaves open the possibility that its effect on behavior may result partially by
interfering with cognitive processing.
Another potential route for the influence of arousal on decision making is through
increases in sexual motivation and desire. Ariely and Loewenstein (2006) investigated the
influence of sexual arousal on the attractiveness of different sexual activities, participants’
willingness to engage in coercive measures to achieve sex, and on willingness to engage in
sexual risk behavior. The study found that sexual arousal influenced all three domains.
Specifically, higher levels of sexual arousal increased the relative attractiveness of various sexual
activities. Even activities that were judged to be unattractive without arousal were later deemed
attractive under conditions of arousal. Similarly, participants seemed less concerned with norms
and ethics while sexually aroused and were more willing to engage in acts such as coercion in
order to obtain sex. Finally, higher levels of sexual arousal increased participants’ willingness to
engage in sexual risk behavior. Not surprisingly, sexual arousal did so at least partially by
increasing participants’ level of motivation and desire to have sex. This provides support for the
notion that individuals under states of sexual arousal become increasingly myopic, focusing
more on momentary desires and threats and less on long-term goals and consequences.
A final study has supported the notion that arousal may thwart cognitive processing and
may result in decisional myopia. Researchers recruited men who reported high intentions for
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using condoms and examined the role of sexual arousal on discrepancies between past and
imagined behavior (Ditto, Pizarro, Epstein, Jacobson, & MacDonald, 2006). Specifically, the
researchers found that participants in low arousal conditions predicted future sexual behavior that
was consistent with their past behavior. However, those participants in the sexual arousal
condition had a significantly higher likelihood of reporting that they would be likely to engage in
sexual risk behavior in the future. The authors conducted additional analyses which
demonstrated that participants who were aroused had significantly fewer thoughts about the risks
of unprotected sex and significantly more thoughts about the attractiveness of their partners. The
authors did not find support for the notion that decreased risk perception mediated the
association between arousal and behavior, thus suggesting—but again, not testing—the
possibility that arousal does so by reducing or interfering with cognitive processing. These
findings again support the suggesting in the affect heuristic that positive feelings (i.e., sexual
arousal) about a behavior (i.e., sex) lead to an increased focus on benefits and a decreased focus
on risk and that, as a result of focusing on these short-term benefits rather than long-term
consequences, arousal leads to discrepancies between intentions and behavior.
Though much of the research on arousal and sexual decision making has been conducted
experimentally, some research has also been done on real-world behavior. Mustanski (2007)
utilized a daily diary methodology for a sample of MSM. He utilized both trait and state
measures of sexual arousal and examined their effects on a composite of sexual risk behavior.
Results demonstrated that, although trait-level sexual arousal (i.e., having higher average levels
of sexual behavior than other individuals) was not associated with risk behavior, state-level
sexual arousal (i.e., having higher levels of sexual arousal on a given day compared with other
days) was associated with increases in risk. This study supports experimental findings regarding
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the role of arousal in sexual decision making using observational research and suggests these
findings have ecological validity.
Taken together, this research provides empirical support for the notion that heightened
levels of arousal may lead to a state of decisional myopia whereby individuals make decisions
based on short-term rather than long-term implications. These studies suggest that individuals
who are “in the moment” and under states of arousal act in ways that are inconsistent with their
intentions and focused on short-term rather than long-term outcomes. Further, these results
suggest that, contrary to hypotheses that hot processing leads to changes in cognitive processing,
arousal may influence decision making by interfering with the ability to act on one’s intentions.
This suggests that, rather than providing input into System 2 processing, System 1 acts
simultaneously and potentially in conflict with System 2 and arousal leads to the dominance of
System 1. As predicted by theories such as the risk as feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al.,
2001), this suggests that Systems 1 and 2 act in parallel and that under certain conditions (e.g.,
risk/conflict, affect, arousal) the two systems may be acting to promote different goals, with
System 1’s dominance favoring short-term outcomes to minimize immediate losses or maximize
immediate gains (as opposed to focusing on maximizing long-term gains and minimizing longterm losses).
Summary
The review thus far suggests that dual process decision researchers have rarely tackled
the issue of sexual decision making and, conversely, researchers studying sexual behavior have
yet to utilize and test dual process theories. There are several potential reasons for the lack of
applied research that utilizes dual process decision making theories to study the role of affect and
arousal on sexual behavior. One possible reason is that studying decision making is incredibly
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complex and, as a result, it is done almost entirely through experimental and laboratory-based
work. This was evident in the literature on sexual arousal and decision making, where almost all
studies were conducted in an experimental framework. New assessment tools may be needed to
apply some of the dual process research methods to a non-experimental framework in order to
produce research on sexual behavior that retains external validity. Another possibility is that
researchers utilizing dual process theories of decision making are concerned more with the
decision making process than the behavioral outcome, per se, and that the behavioral outcome
studied is typically one of convenience more than importance. However, both aspects of the
model (the process and the outcome) are important theoretically and practically, and the
utilization of these theories may help to improve the predictive power of existing models of
sexual behavior. As such, more research is needed that utilizes a dual process approach to study
sexual decision making.
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Chapter 4: Individual and Within-Person Differences in Decision Making
Decision making itself is a within-person process that occurs within a specific event in
which a choice must be made, though the literature on cognitive styles has long demonstrated
that there are also individual—or between-person—differences in the ways in which people
execute decision making tasks (Henderson & Nutt, 1980; Hunt, Krzystofiak, Meindl, & Yousry,
1989; Myers, 1987; Phillips, Pazienza, & Ferrin, 1984). Some people may rely more or less
heavily on System 1 processing than others and arrive at different decisions based on the same
set of available options (i.e., between-person differences). Similarly, that same person may rely
more or less heavily on System 1 processing within specific situations to arrive at varying
decisions over time and context (i.e., within-person differences). For example, a man who
regularly feels lower-than-average levels of sexual arousal compared with other men (i.e.,
between-person difference) may find himself in a situation in which he is suddenly much more
aroused than he typically feels on a given day (i.e., within-person difference). The work by
Mischel and colleagues (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel & Shoda, 1995) suggested that
certain individual traits (e.g., rejection sensitivity; Downey & Feldman, 1996) might influence
the extent to which individuals utilize affective versus cognitive processing. Furthermore, many
of the theories reviewed in Chapter 2 (e.g., SCT, TPB, HBM, IMB) relied exclusively on
individual differences in trait-like System 2 processes (e.g., self-efficacy, intentions) to predict
sexual decision making. Given that decision making can be impacted by individual-level traits or
viewed in an aggregated fashion at the individual level while also acknowledging the fact that
decisions are momentary, an approach that takes both levels of influence into account might best
capture the decision making process.
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In contrast to a within-person focus on decision making that takes into account
fluctuating processes and situational influences, the SCT-based models of decision making that
have been widely used in the sexual behavior literature to date rely primarily on individual-level
variables such as attitudes and intentions that are generally presumed to be stable. This
methodological approach may be one potential limitation of the existing literature on sexual
decision making. For example, the mixed results demonstrated in the Crepaz and Marks (2001)
meta-analysis on the utility of affect in predicting sexual risk behavior may have been due to
within-person fluctuations in both affect and behavior. To the extent that people are more
influenced by how they think or feel in the moment versus how they think or feel in general, they
may rely more on momentary fluctuations in affect and cognition. Similarly, to the extent that
peoples’ sexual behavior is inconsistent across situations, partners, and time, its fluctuations are
likely to be associated with other fluctuating factors such as momentary affect and cognition.
Examining within-person processes by aggregating them to the individual level is known
as the ecological fallacy, and has the potential to produce results that may be drastically different
from what would be obtained in a non-aggregated, within-person analysis. This results from
several factors, one of which is the fact that aggregation relies on modeling averages and ignores
within-person variability around those averages. In addition to the fact that SCT-based theories
typically rely on aggregated decision making, the existing research on affective processes and
sexual behavior has typically been conducted with cross-sectional, aggregated data. In an
editorial that followed the publication of the Crepaz and Marks (2001) meta-analysis, Kalichman
and Weinhardt (2001) pointed out some additional weaknesses of the literature used for their
investigation. For example, the included studies were largely cross-sectional, examined global
assessments of affect or conflated affect with mood, and relied on aggregated sexual behavior

45
data. Overall, much of the research on sexual decision making in general—whether it has
included affect or not—has been conducted as an investigation of between-person processes and
has largely ignored the role of within-person fluctuations in decision making and behavior.
Not surprisingly, there has long been a call for an approach to psychological theory that
accounts for both stable individual differences and fluctuating within-person processes. For
example, in their cognitive-affective system theory, Mischel and Shoda (1995) describe a
theoretical framework to unify the investigation of dynamics of human behavior at both the
individual and the situational level. In this paper, the authors describe a framework for
understanding how dispositional traits, environmental stimuli, and affective and cognitive
processing interact to produce situational variability in behavior. They suggest that personality
differences lead to differences in the perception of situational cues which ultimately leads to
changes in affective and cognitive processing that produce behavior. Building on this work,
Metcalfe and Mischel (1999) outline environmental characteristics such as acute and chronic
stressors that influence cognitive and affective processing that lead “hot” processing to interrupt
“cool” processing. These interruptions ultimately lead to situational departures from more longterm, stable intentions and goals. This work provides a framework through which to better
understand the interactions of persons and their environments and how this influences decision
making.
There has recently been a similar call for an acknowledgement of the role of multiple
levels of influence within the literature on sexual behavior. For example, Cooper (2010)
describes the ways in which sexual behavior meaningfully differs at both the level of the
individual and the level of the sexual situation or event. The author found that there is variability
at the individual level that can be attributed to individual differences. However, although she
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found that there were predictable individual differences in sexual risk behavior, her work
demonstrated that a majority of the variation in behavior existed at the level of the sexual event.
Moreover, this intraindividual variation in behavior was predicted by variation in individual
traits and situational characteristics. These within-person predictors were stronger predictors of
sexual behavior than characteristics of the individual, overall. Cooper ended by echoing the
concerns of Mischel and his colleagues—sexual behavior is best understood as an interaction
between persons and contexts over time.
Researchers who have utilized an event-level approach to studying sexual behavior have
found support for the idea that both between-person and within-person differences have
significant associations with event-level sexual behavior (Fortenberry et al., 2005; Grov, Golub,
et al., 2010; Mustanski, 2004, 2007; Shrier et al., 2005). For example, Grov et al. (2010) found
that daily negative affect reduced the risk of unprotected sex on a given day. On days when men
felt higher levels of negative affect, they had lower odds of engaging in unprotected sex than on
days when they had lower levels of negative affect. However, the authors also found that this
within-person process interacted with individual-level differences in personal attributes. For men
who were sexually compulsive, fluctuations in negative affect were less associated with their risk
behavior than for men who were not sexually compulsive. While it is important to learn more
about the extent to which affect is involved in sexual decision making, it may be significantly
more important to better understand for whom and under what circumstances it is most
influential. This combination of individual differences and within-person processes highlights
the types of questions that a dual process theory such as the CAPS model (Mischel & Shoda,
1995) might be best suited to answer given its acknowledgement of dispositional and situational
influences on decision making.
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In a recent publication, Frankish (2009) describes the extent to which Systems 1 and 2
operate at different levels in making what he calls a personal-subpersonal distinction. He
describes personal events as those which can be ascribed to the individual as a whole. For
example, people have beliefs and desires. On the other hand, subpersonal events are those which
can be attributed to the state a person’s subsystems rather than the person as a whole. For
example, a certain brain area (e.g., the amygdala) may activate a certain process (e.g., fear) that
is attributable to that subsystem rather than to the person. In doing so, Frankish sets up a loose
dichotomy between dual processes and being trait versus state phenomena. As I mentioned
previously, decision making is best viewed as an event-level process given that decisions are, by
definition, unique decisional events. Frankish also implies that much of the work of System 2
happens at the personal (i.e., individual) level through the ongoing interaction of past memories,
current beliefs and desires, and future goals and intentions. In contrast, much of what happens
within System 1 occurs at the subpersonal (i.e., within-person) level as a result of the fact that
much of it occurs quickly and momentarily, unconsciously, and in relation to bodily states and
biology. As such, dual process theories may be particularly relevant for an investigation of
decision making that incorporates elements of both between- and within-person processes to
better understand both the consistent and varying aspects of the sexual decisions people make.
Personality or dispositional traits are individual (i.e., between-person) differences that
can influence cognitive-affective (i.e., within-person) processing (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). As
mentioned previously, one specific type of personality-by-situation interaction that may have an
influence on decision making is rejection sensitivity (Downey & Feldman, 1996). The theory
posits that, within interpersonal situations, individuals with high levels of rejection sensitivity
process environmental cues with high levels of anxious expectation of rejection and makes
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attempts to avoid such rejection. The threat of rejection places individuals in a state of stress and
negative arousal, thus eliciting System 1 processing to occur without the control or correction by
System 2 processing (Ayduk et al., 2000). Indeed, research has demonstrated the relevance of
rejection sensitivity for sexual decision making. One study of young women found that those
who were high in rejection sensitivity had lower intentions for condom use than those with lower
rejection sensitivity when they felt rejected within an experimental sexual vignette (Crabtree,
2012). Another study of Australian young adults, researchers found a significant association
between rejection sensitivity and condom use (Edwards & Barber, 2010). Specifically, among
participants who wanted to use condoms, those who were high in rejection sensitivity used
condoms less often if they perceived that their partner did not want to use condoms. These
findings suggest that participants high in rejection sensitivity favored their partners’ condom use
preferences over their own, suggesting that fear of rejection or disappointing their partner was
more influential over decision making than their own perceived consequences of non-condom
use. Taken together, these findings support the role of rejection sensitivity in sexual decision
making, though no study to date has examined whether the construct of rejection sensitivity can
be directly applied to condom use as the source of rejection rather than examining general
processes of rejection sensitivity. The findings bolster the proposition that rejection sensitivity
may act to heighten feelings of threat, increase levels of System 1 processing, and shift decision
making from focusing on the long-term consequences of non-condom use to short-term,
interpersonal consequences of condom use.
Summary
Researchers studying decision making in general and those examining sexual behavior
specifically may benefit from considering behavior to be the result of interactions between
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individual-level and event-level characteristics. Within the broader field of psychology and
within the literature on sex research, individuals have investigated these phenomena and found
support for the role that both levels of analysis play in shaping human behavior. Although there
is a wide degree of consistency in behavior that can be investigated within an individual
differences paradigm, individuals typically have considerable situational variability in their
behavior that results from adaptations made to specific contexts and environments. The literature
reviewed above suggests that an approach to understanding sexual decision making that takes
into account both within-person and between-person processes may be particularly beneficial.
Dual process theories may be aptly suited to such an investigation, as they occur in parallel and
can be influenced by individual-level traits. An investigation of the extent to which Systems 1
and 2 influence behaviors through individual-level versus within-person processes may provide
new insights into the ways in which sexual decisions are made over time, across contexts, and
both within and between individuals. These processes may be influenced by dispositional traits
such as rejection sensitivity that increase System 1 processing of situational cues and cause
subsequent increases in decisional myopia.
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Chapter 5: Overview of the Proposed Research
Throughout the previous chapters, I have reviewed literature that supports the
development of a dual process model that examines the role of individual-level characteristics
and event-level processing to predict sexual decision making and behavior. The second chapter
highlighted the importance of considering affect and arousal in theories of decision making,
while the third chapter highlighted the notable lack of such constructs in the major models of
sexual decision making. Throughout these two chapters, I discussed several theories and
empirical studies that have described the interaction of individual characteristics with event-level
processing, and I ended with a fourth chapter focusing on the interacting role of between- and
within-person differences in decision making. Taken together, these chapters contain a review of
significant literature in the field that allows for the development of testable research hypotheses
for a dual process model of sexual decision making.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the affect heuristic suggests that decisions are likely to rely on
simple mental associations between the choices and previous emotional associations that are tied
with either positive or negative valence (Slovic et al., 2007). As such, affectively-based System 1
processing leads to a mental “shortcut” to arrive more quickly at decisions. This was built upon
within Damasio’s (1994) social marker hypothesis, which suggests that the process of decision
making occurs vis-à-vis a feedback loop between the body and the brain that requires intact
affective processing in order to conduct rational decision making. While giving the same weight
to affective processing as the prior two theories, the risk as feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et
al., 2001) suggests that situations of risk and uncertainty can produce conflicts between Systems
1 and 2, leading System 1 to overtake decision-making and potentially produce results that are
inconsistent with long-term, deliberative intentions. These theories place a similar emphasis on
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the prominent role of affect and arousal (i.e., System 1 processing) for decision making while
providing different hypotheses about the exact mechanisms of this influence.
Building upon theories about the prominence of affect for sexual decision making,
additional work suggested that internal (i.e., personality) and external (i.e., contextual) influences
may alter the relative dominance of affective and cognitive processing during decision making.
Incorporating the role of dispositional and personality traits into models of decision making,
Mischel and Shoda (1995) proposed that individuals interact with their situations in ways that
produce understandable variations in behavior. Personality interacts with features of the
environment to produce differential cognitive-affective processing. The activation of these
cognitive-affective processing profiles then produces specific routes for decision making that
lead to behavior. The theory of rejection sensitivity (Downey & Feldman, 1996) built on the
work of Mischel and colleagues to propose one specific type of dispositional trait that can
influence decision making in interpersonal situations. Specifically, rejection sensitivity is a
disposition that leads individuals to anxiously expect rejection, creating a cascade whereby they
potentially misinterpret situational cues and prioritize actions aimed at avoiding potential
rejection. Rejection sensitivity is, thus, one such dispositional trait that can lead to decisional
myopia through its altering of the perception of situational cues and thus the cascading increase
in affective processing and decisional myopia.
Similar to theories regarding the role of personality in biasing decision making, Metcalfe
and Mischel (1999) describe their “hot/cool” system of decision making to account for the
influence of contextual factors on cognitive-affective processing that can lead to situational
variability and inconsistencies between intentions and behavior. Specifically, they note that
environmental characteristics such as acute and chronic stress can lead to increases in hot
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processing that subsequently interfere with cool, cognitive processing to focus on short-term
rather than long-term goals and consequences. These findings suggest that environmental
characteristics are likely to account for some of the variation in individual behavior by altering
the relative influence of affective and cognitive processing during decision making.
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2007) proposed a dual process model of decision making
that provided several propositions regarding additional situational characteristics that can lead
affective processing to interfere with deliberative processing. The two major features of
situational cues—proximity and vividness—lead individuals’ affective processing to increase
and, when affective and cognitive processing are motivated to focus on different outcomes,
affective processing thwarts deliberative, cognitive processing. Finally, Loewenstein (1996)
outlined the significant influence that visceral states such as arousal and affect can have on
decision making. His research suggests that states of arousal can undermine the ability to act on
one’s intentions in two significant ways. First, individuals are unable to imagine the impact that
arousal has on their decision making during times when they are not aroused, and thus
overestimate the extent to which they will be able or want to perform a given behavior under
states of arousal. As such, their behavioral intentions are likely to be overestimations, to the
extent that the behavior is likely to be performed under states of arousal. Second, in addition to
intentions being formed while not aroused and thus being overestimated, increasing levels of
arousal can lead to increasing discrepancies between intentions and behavior through several
means including increases in impulsivity. The work of Loewenstein suggested that proximity and
vividness of an outcome and the extent to which a person is experiencing arousal may both lead
to an increased focus on maximizing gains and minimizing consequences of short-term rather
than long-term outcomes.
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Taken together, these theories led me to propose the notion of a decisional myopia that
occurs under situations where dispositions and environmental cues increase affective processing
and cause conflicts between affect and cognition. Specifically, decision making that occurs under
high levels of affective processing is likely to focus on short-term, proximal, and salient
outcomes or consequences rather than long-term goals or intentions, leading to decisions that
favor the pursuit of affective desires or the escape of affective threats. Additionally, as
mentioned previously, dispositional traits can lead to differential profiles of cognitive-affective
processing within such situations by means of changing the interpretation of situational cues.
Studies on rejection sensitivity have suggested that it may be one such dispositional trait that
alters the processing of situational cues, increasing System 1 processing and feelings of threat
and subsequently leading to decisional myopia and a focus on short-term consequences of
condom use rather than long-term consequences of non-condom use.
Aims and Hypotheses
Based on the literature reviewed, the overarching aim of this project is to investigate a
dual process model of sexual decision making that examines the notion of decisional myopia and
integrates both individual differences (e.g., rejection sensitivity) and within-person processes
(e.g., fluctuating situational affect). As such, the project was designed to test several hypotheses
which I review below.
Aim 1. The first aim of this dissertation is to evaluate a dual process model of sexual
decision making. In doing so, it is important not to conflate the effects of trait levels with state
levels of these constructs. As such, I will disaggregate the daily measurements of several key
constructs into between and within-person effects using established techniques. First, I will
examine the contribution of System 1 processing, operationalized as anxious and sexual arousal,
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to event-level sexual decision making. Based on the literature I have reviewed suggesting that
both affect and arousal can increase sexual risk, I hypothesize the following regarding the main
effects of System 1 processes (see Figure 1):
Hypothesis 1a: Within-person deviated (i.e., state) anxious arousal will be positively
associated with engaging in UAI.
Hypothesis 1b: Within-person deviated (i.e., state) sexual arousal will be positively
associated with engaging in UAI.
I make no hypotheses about the role of trait or dispositional level arousal given that it was not
found to be significantly associated with sexual behavior in research reviewed previously.
However, I will adjust for their effects within the models and explore the extent to which they
are independently associated with sexual behavior.
Despite relatively consistent findings throughout the literature, it is important to
demonstrate the relevance of System 2 processing as well, particularly within the context of a
dual process model. As such, I will investigate the role of System 2 processing, operationalized
as perceived behavioral control, as a predictor of sexual behavior at both the within-person and
between-person levels. Additionally, I will examine the role of individual-level self-efficacy,
which shares much in common with perceived behavioral control, in order to examine whether
between-person deviated perceived behavioral control and self-efficacy measured at the
individual level converge in their predictions. I will test the following hypotheses regarding the
main effects of System 2 processes (see Figure 2):
Hypothesis 2a: Within-person deviated perceived behavioral control will be negatively
associated with engaging in UAI.
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Hypothesis 2b: Between-person deviated perceived behavioral control will be negatively
associated with engaging in UAI.
Hypothesis 2c: Individual-level self-efficacy will be negatively associated with engaging
in UAI.
The hallmark of a dual process theory is the simultaneous operation of Systems 1 and 2.
The literature reviewed suggests that increases in state levels of sexual arousal are associated
with increased risk, but also that this increase occurs through an interaction with System 2
processing. As depicted in Figure 3, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3: There will be a significant interaction between within-person deviated
sexual arousal and within-person deviated perceived behavioral control, such that the
previously hypothesized negative association between perceived behavioral control and
UAI will be attenuated by sexual arousal.
This interaction would provide support for the notion that System 1 processing is able to
interrupt System 2 processing during times of arousal, as described in the risk as feelings
hypothesis. An alternative hypothesis presented in the literature is that System 1 processing feeds
into System 2 processing, causing changes in the way System 2 conducts traditional cost-benefit
analyses as described in the somatic marker hypothesis. As such, I will test for evidence of a
mediational association between the two along with this hypothesis to explore this alternative. In
doing so, I will examine the extent to which higher levels of arousal decrease one’s perceptions
of behavioral control, thus indirectly leading to increases in the odds of UAI.
Aim 2. The second aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate the relevance of rejection
sensitivity (RS) as a dispositional trait influencing sexual decision making. I will do this using a
newly developed scale measuring the extent to which individuals fear rejection from partners if
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they insist on using condoms (i.e., condom-related rejection sensitivity). In addition to
psychometric analysis in which I will present preliminary validation of the measure, I
hypothesize a direct effect of RS on condom use:
Hypothesis 4: Rejection sensitivity will be positively associated with engaging in UAI.
In order for rejection sensitivity to act upon sexual decision making, it should meet certain
criteria based on the previously reviewed literature. First, RS should lead individuals to
anxiously expect rejection and increase affective processing as the threat of rejection increases.
As pictured in Figure 4, I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 5a: Condom-related RS will be associated with increases in daily anxious
arousal
Hypothesis 5b: The increased levels of daily anxious arousal for men higher in rejection
sensitivity will be moderated by whether or not the participant engaged in anal sex with a
casual male partner that day, such that men who are high in condom-related rejection
sensitivity will experience more anxiety on days when they must make decisions
regarding condom use (i.e., sex days).
Specifically, hypothesis 5b suggests that anxiety occurs at least partially as a result of being in a
sexual environment. However, the key component of the hypothesis is that this effect is most
pronounced (or perhaps only exists) for individuals high in condom-related RS. This hypothesis
will provide support for the notion that RS creates the conditions for increased affective
processing which ultimately leads to decisional myopia.
In addition to creating increased affective processing, I will examine mechanisms of the
association between condom-related rejection sensitivity and UAI. I will begin by investigating
whether rejection sensitivity is able to act upon UAI by creating a situation in which attention is
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shifted from long-term health behaviors to short-term rejection avoidance. Specifically, I will
examine whether rejection sensitivity leads people to focus less on safer sex and more on
rejection avoidance by testing the following:
Hypothesis 6: Individual-level self-efficacy and condom-related RS will interact to
predict UAI such that the negative association between self-efficacy and UAI will be
attenuated for individuals with higher levels of condom-related RS (see Figure 5).
This hypothesis provides the next step from hypothesis 5b—having established that RS is
associated with increased affect and thus, affective processing, hypothesis 6 would provide
support for the idea that individuals can hold competing goals. Under such conditions, it is
plausible that individuals could have long-term goals (i.e., condom use to prevent HIV) that are
in conflict with short-term goals (i.e., UAI to prevent rejection). This finding would provide
evidence of the necessary criteria for decisional myopia to occur. Specifically, it would suggest
that individuals with conflicting levels of condom-related RS and self-efficacy may have
competing goals with regards to condom use (i.e., short-term goals to prevent rejection and longterm goals to prevent HIV infection).
The final step will be to demonstrate the existence of cognitive myopia itself. To do so, I
will test the following hypotheses depicted in Figure 6:
Hypothesis 7a: RS will significantly increase the association between within-person
deviated anxious arousal and increased engagement in UAI.
Hypothesis 7b: RS will significantly increase the association between within-person
deviated sexual arousal and increased engagement in UAI.
These hypotheses would provide support for the notion of decisional myopia by demonstrating
that the association between affect/arousal and risk is at least partially attributable to RS. This
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would suggest that individuals have shifted focus from a distal consequence (i.e., HIV infection)
to proximal and salient consequence (i.e., rejection).
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Chapter 6: Method
Data for this dissertation were collected with support from a fellowship from the National
Institute of Mental Health (F31-MH095622) which had as its aims both secondary data analysis
and the collection and analysis of data specifically for this dissertation. Secondary data analyses
were conducted from data collected as part of an existing study (i.e., the ‘parent project’), The
Pillow Talk Project (R01-MH087714; PI: Parsons), a study of highly sexually active gay and
bisexual men in New York City. Data for the parent project and those specific to this dissertation
were collected as part of a single CASI survey prior to participants’ follow-up visits.
Specifically, this dissertation project focuses on data collected from an at-home CASI completed
prior to the parent project’s 12-month follow-up appointment as well as a 30-day online daily
diary conducted immediately following the 12-month appointment. Follow-up completion for the
parent project is currently ongoing and analyses were focused on a subsample of 207 men who
have completed the necessary components of the study to date, as I describe below.
Participants and Procedures
All participants in this study provided informed consent to participate in the parent
project at their baseline appointment and renewed their informed consent during the 12-month
appointment. Prior to the 12-month visit, participants were entered into a secure mailing list
using the Qualtrics survey software and a survey was programmed to be distributed to them
shortly before the date of their scheduled follow-up appointment. Following completion of their
12-month visit, participants were then asked to complete an online daily diary for the 30 days.
Participants were compensated $60 for their full completion of the 12 month visit and could earn
up to $60 for completing all 30 days of the online diary ($1 per day with a $5 bonus for every 5
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days completed). All procedures were reviewed and approved by the Office of Research
Protections of the City University of New York.
Relevant procedures from the parent project. From February of 2011 until June of
2013, participants were enrolled into the parent project using a combination of recruitment
strategies, including: respondent-driven sampling (RDS); internet-based advertisements on social
networking (e.g., Facebook), community forum (e.g., Craigslist), and sexual networking (e.g.,
Manhunt, Adam4Adam) websites; mobile phone-based advertisements on sexual networking
(e.g., Grindr) applications; email advertisements through New York City sex party listservs; and
active recruitment in New York City venues such as gay bars and clubs as well as sex parties.
Preliminary eligibility was ascertained for each participant by completing a brief, phone-based
interview with a member of the research staff to confirm the participant met the following
inclusion criteria: (1) was at least 18 years of age; (2) was biologically male and self-identified as
male; (3) had at least nine unique male sexual partners in the prior 90 days, with at least two of
those in the prior 30 days; (4) self-identified as gay, bisexual, or another non-heterosexual
identity (e.g., queer); and (5) had daily access to the internet in order to complete several
internet-based assessments and the daily diary studies. The study operationalized highly sexually
active as having at least 9 sexual partners in the 90 days prior to enrollment, with at least 2 of
these partners being within the prior 30 days. These cutoffs were based off of prior research
(Grov, Parsons, & Bimbi, 2010; Parsons, Bimbi, & Halkitis, 2001; Parsons et al., 2008),
including a probability-based sample of urban MSM (Stall et al., 2003; Stall et al., 2001) that
found that 9 partners was more than 2 to 3 times the average number of sexual partners among
sexually active gay and bisexual men. All inclusion criteria were confirmed during participants’
initial parent project study visits.
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Participants who met all inclusion criteria were nonetheless considered ineligible if they
met any of the following exclusion criteria: (1) being unable to complete all aspects of the study
design in English; (2) demonstrating evidence of serious cognitive or psychiatric impairment that
would interfere with their participation or limit their ability to provide informed consent; or (3)
receiving an HIV-positive diagnosis during HIV testing procedures at baseline (conducted only
for participants who self-report being HIV-negative; HIV-positive participants with a confirmed
diagnosis are eligible for the project). The exclusion of those who tested HIV-positive was for a
six month period only and was designed to allow for their facilitation into care, after which they
were free to enroll into the study.
The parent project consisted of two baseline appointments within one month of each
other, a 6 month follow-up, an optional 9 month follow-up CASI online, and a 12 month followup which had both at-home (internet-based) procedures as well as in-office procedures. For the
first 30 days following the first baseline appointment and the 12 month follow-up visit,
participants also completed an online daily diary. Participants completed online CASI surveys
from their home prior to each visit and the baseline and 12-month CASIs each contained
informed consent procedures. Informed consent for the full project was obtained at the beginning
of the baseline appointments and again at their 12-month visits as per the protocols of the
CUNY-wide IRB.
Measures
Measures for this dissertation were collected from two sources—an online CASI
conducted from home prior to the parent project’s 12-month follow-up assessment (including
measures specific to this dissertation study) and an online 30-day daily diary completed after the
12-month assessment, both of which were required for participation in the parent project. Those
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measures collected as part of the online daily diary were considered to be within-person
measures as a result of their repeated measurement over time, while those collected as part of the
12-month CASI prior to their visit were considered to be between-person measures as a result of
their one-time measurement.
Within-person measures from the daily diary. Participants completed several measures
as a part of their online daily diaries that they complete for the 30 days following their 12 month
follow-up visit. Each day, participants received a unique link to complete their online diary at
8pm, and the link expired if it had not been completed by 10am the following morning. The
survey began with an assessment of their affect over the course of the day, followed by
information about substance use (not included for this dissertation), and finally an assessment of
sexual behavior. The section on sexual behavior began by asking whether or not they had any
sexual contact for the day and, if so, with whom. For those who reported a main partner,
participants were asked separately about behavior with that partner (analyses for this dissertation
did not focus on behaviors with a main partner). For each casual partner (defined simply as a
non-main partner) for the day, participants were asked a series of questions about characteristics
of the partner and the types of behavior in which they had engaged with that partner. If
participants had more than four casual partners in a given day, the first four were asked in detail
and the remaining partners were asked about within a combined summary to reduce burden.
Below I describe the primary variables from the diary that were used in analyses. Based on my
review of the literature, I chose to utilize measures of anxious affect and sexual arousal as
System 1 variables and perceived behavioral control as a System 2 variable.
Sexual behavior. The hypotheses for this dissertation utilized two different sexual
behaviors: any anal sex with a casual partner on a given day as a predictor (hypotheses 5a and
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5b) and any UAI with a casual partner on a given day as an outcome (all others). All analyses
focused on casual rather than main partners as the process of sexual decision making for main
partners is likely to differ from that with casual partners. For analyses focused on whether or not
a participant engaged in anal sex with a casual male partner, I recoded questions which asked
whether or not the participant had engaged in receptive or insertive anal sex with each casual
partner for that day into a single indicator of having at least one anal sex act versus having none
(any anal sex = 1, no anal sex = 0). The primary outcome of most analyses was whether or not
participants engaged in UAI on a given day with a casual male partner. For the purposes of this
dissertation, UAI was defined as any anal intercourse without a condom that occured with a
casual (i.e., non-main) sexual partner of any HIV status. As mentioned previously, behavior was
measured each day on a partner-by-partner basis, with participants being asked to indicate
whether they had receptive and insertive anal intercourse with, without, or both with and without
condoms with each partner on that day. Because event-level predictor variables were measured at
the level of the day rather than each sexual partner or event, sexual behavior was recoded into a
day-level, three-category (i.e., trichotomous) indicator of UAI. Participants who reported having
either receptive or insertive anal sex without a condom at least once with at least one casual
partner on a given day were coded as yes for that day, which was assigned a value of 2. Those
who reported having sexual activity with a casual partner but had no anal sex or had anal sex but
only with condoms were coded as a 1 for analyses and served as the comparison group
throughout analyses. Those who reported no sexual activity with a casual partner on a given day
were assigned a value of 0 and, though included in all analyses (utilizing multinomial logistic
regression), comparisons between this group and the others will not be reported.
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Affect and arousal. Anxious affect and sexual arousal were measured using an
adaptation of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; D. Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988) and the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ; D. Watson &
Clark, 1991) that have been previously used by Mustanski and colleagues (Grov, Golub, et al.,
2010; Mustanski, 2007) in daily diary research on gay and bisexual men. Participants were asked
to, “Indicate to what extent you have felt each of the following ways today” on a scale ranging
from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 4 (extremely). In addition to items measuring positive and
negative affect that will not be utilized for this dissertation, the scale contained items measuring
the domains of anxious arousal (e.g., “jittery,” “scared,” and “nervous”) and sexual arousal (e.g.,
“sexually interested,” “sexually aroused,” and “horny”). Scale scores were created by averaging
across the items for each subscale following a factor analysis which will be described in a
forthcoming section. Additional information regarding the centering of each scale and the
partitioning of variance to the within- and between-person levels is provided at the end of this
chapter.
Perceived behavioral control. In order to assess perceived behavioral control on a daily
basis, participants were asked to respond to the question “how much control did you feel over
your sexual behavior today?” with responses ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3 (very in control).
Between-person measures from the at-home CASI. Participants completed several
measures as part of the online CASI prior to their 12 month follow-up visits that tapped into
individual differences in several key variables. For the purposes of this dissertation, I focused on
the role of a newly developed scale, condom-related rejection sensitivity, as well as the role of
safer sex self-efficacy as individual-level (i.e., between-person) variables.
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Condom-based rejection sensitivity. Following the format of rejection sensitivity as
typically measured in the Adult Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (RSQ; Downey & Feldman,
1996) and others (Pachankis, Goldfried, & Ramrattan, 2008), I developed a scale to examine
rejection sensitivity specifically within the context of decisions about condom use. Based on the
results of a qualitative pilot study with 23 HIV-positive adults in New York City, I generated a
list of seven scenarios in which a decision must be made regarding whether or not to use a
condom in which there might be a high likelihood that the partner would be rejecting or the
participant might be worried about rejection if he chooses to use a condom. The content of each
item and its response options can be found in the Appendix. Participants responded to items
about anxiety (e.g., “How concerned/anxious would you be that he would not want to have sex
with you if you insisted on using a condom?”) and likelihood (e.g., “How likely is it that he
would not want to continue dating you if you insisted on using a condom?”) on a scale ranging
from 1 (very unconcerned or very unlikely) to 6 (very concerned or very likely). Consistent with
the RS paradigm, the anxiety and likelihood items were multiplied within each situation and then
averaged across situations to form a total score. Additional information regarding psychometrics
of the scale is presented within Chapter 7.
Safer sex self-efficacy. Participants’ sense of control over and skill regarding their
condom use was measured using the 13-item Safer Sex Self-Efficacy Questionnaire (SSSEQ;
Parsons, Halkitis, Bimbi, & Borkowski, 2000; Wells, Golub, & Parsons, 2011). Participants were
asked “How confident are you that you could avoid having anal sex without a condom…” across
a variety of different sexual situations (e.g., “when you really want sex?” and “when you are
drunk or high on drugs?”). Responses range on a Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all confident) to
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5 (extremely confident) and were summed to form an overall score ranging from 13 to 65 with
strong reliability (α = 0.97).
Data Analysis Plan
Data analyses occurred in several phases. First, I conducted preliminary descriptive
analyses of the sample, including demographic characteristics, retention from the parent project
through to the present analytic sample, and information regarding daily diary reactivity and
confounding variables. Next, I conducted psychometric investigations of the measure of anxious
and sexual arousal as well as the newly created measure of condom-related rejection sensitivity
to ensure that the versions used within later analyses adequately meet statistical assumptions
such as unidimensionality. Finally, I iteratively conducted a series of multilevel models to test
the hypotheses of this dissertation.
Descriptive statistics. I began by examining the demographic properties of the sample
using basic descriptive statistics. I next conducted basic descriptive statistics to describe the flow
of participants from their initial baseline appointments in the parent project into the analytic
sample for this dissertation. In a final set of analyses, I conducted basic multilevel models to
characterize the extent to which reactivity (i.e., changing behavior over time) to the diary was
evident (i.e., by examining whether the odds of UAI changed as a function of time) as well as
examining demographic confounding variables (i.e., by examining the extent to which
demographic characteristics of the sample were significantly associated with the odds of UAI in
a multilevel model). The first step was specifying a model in which the only predictor was a
level-1 (i.e., within-person) indicator for time (i.e., day 0 through 30, centered at day 15). After
examining whether the outcome changed as a function of diary day, I also entered a quadratic
and then a cubic term to examine the possibility of a nonlinear association between time and the
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odds of UAI. In the case of non-significant findings, I recoded time into additional variables that
may better account for any of time such as day of week (i.e., a categorical indicator from 1 to 7),
or whether or not it was a weekend. Were time found to be significant, it would be retained in all
further models to adjust for its confounding effect. A similar strategy was utilized for
demographic confounders, whereby demographic characteristics were simultaneously entered
and examined for significant associations with UAI.
Psychometric investigations. I began by conducting a multilevel confirmatory factor
analysis following the technique described by Bryne (2012). Specifically, I utilized Mplus
software version 7.2 to conduct a two-level confirmatory factor analysis of the full, modified
PANAS scale used within the online daily diary. I examined model fit, parameters, and
modification indices and, based on these, made modifications to the scale to improve its structure
prior to use in analysis. I next conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of the newly created
condom-related rejection sensitivity scale to ensure that it was a unidimensional construct.
Specifically, I entered all seven items into a standard confirmatory factor analysis in Mplus
version 7.2
Multilevel modeling. Multilevel modeling occurred in an iterative fashion as suggested
by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). As mentioned previously, I examined the role of time and
demographic variables as confounding variables prior to proceeding with the full analyses.
Following these steps, I began by testing the hypotheses using the appropriate modeling
technique for each. Within each model, I utilized a random intercept with an unstructured
covariance matrix. In order to utilize all available data, all models with UAI as an outcome were
conducted by using the trichotomous sexual behavior indicator (i.e., no sex, sex but no UAI,
UAI) within a multilevel, multinomial logistic model, though only comparisons of the second
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and third categories (sex but no UAI, UAI) will be discussed throughout. Those models in which
anxious arousal is the outcome (i.e., hypotheses 5a and 5b) were conducted utilizing multilevel
linear modeling. Throughout all models, within-person continuous variables (i.e., anxious
arousal, sexual arousal, perceived behavioral control) were centered and underwent a technique
to decompose the variance into both within-person and between-person components (see section
below on centering and variance decomposition for further details). All models with such a
within-person component were adjusted for the impact of the between-person component of the
same variable whether or not the between-person component was included within the hypothesis.
All multilevel models for the testing of hypotheses were conducted using the generalized mixed
modeling feature of SPSS version 20.
Hypotheses 1a and 1b. The first set of hypotheses focused on the direct influence of
within-person deviated (i.e., state) anxious and sexual arousal on the outcome of UAI. I
conducted two multilevel models, one to test each hypothesis, with the trichotomous outcome the
type of sexual behavior a participant engaged in on that day. Specifically, within-person and
between-person deviated anxious arousal were entered as fixed effects in the first model whereas
within-person and between-person deviated sexual arousal were entered as fixed effects in the
second model.
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c. The second set of hypotheses focused on the role of withinperson (i.e., state) and between-person (i.e., trait) deviated perceived behavioral control and
between-person self-efficacy for condom use in predicting UAI. I conducted two multilevel
models, one to test the first two hypotheses and a second model to test the third hypothesis, with
the trichotomous outcome of type of sex the participant engaged in that day. Specifically, the
first model contained within-person and between-person deviated perceived behavioral control as
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fixed effects, while the second model contained both of these variables as well as individuallevel safer sex self-efficacy as a between-person fixed effect.
Hypothesis 3. The third hypothesis focused on the interaction between within-person
deviated (i.e., state) levels of sexual arousal and perceived behavioral control on predicting UAI.
As the main effects of each of these variables had already been examined within previous
analyses, I conducted one model in which the main effects and an interaction term were entered
simultaneously to examine their relative impact on predicting UAI. As with prior analyses, I
utilized a trichotomous outcome of the type of sex in which a participant engaged on that day. To
test the alternative hypothesis that System 2 processes (i.e., perceived behavioral control)
mediate the association between System 1 (i.e., sexual arousal) and UAI, I utilized Mplus version
7.2 to conduct a multilevel path model testing for this possibility.
Hypothesis 4. The fourth hypothesis focused on the role of individual-level condomrelated rejection sensitivity in predicting UAI. I conducted one multilevel model with the
trichotomous outcome. The model did not include any variables at level 1 other than the random
intercept.
Hypotheses 5a and 5b. The fifth set of hypotheses focused on the role of condom-related
rejection sensitivity in levels of anxious arousal on a given day and, in the second model, on days
when a participant must make a decision regarding condom use (i.e., anal sex days). I conducted
two multilevel linear models. In the first model, I predicted daily levels of anxious arousal with
condom-related rejection sensitivity as a level 2 predictor with no level 1 (i.e., within-person)
predictors other than the random intercept. The second model again focused on the direct effect
of condom-related rejection sensitivity in predicting daily levels of anxious arousal but also
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included a main effect of whether or not the participant engaged in anal sex with a casual partner
that day as well as an interaction between rejection sensitivity and engagement in anal sex.
Hypothesis 6. In the sixth hypothesis I proposed that individual-level rejection sensitivity
and self-efficacy would interact to predict UAI, such that rejection sensitivity would diminish the
impact of self-efficacy in reducing the odds of UAI. As such, I entered the main effect of each as
well as an interaction term between these between-person variables simultaneously to examine
the significance of each. The only within-person variable within this model was the random
intercept.
Hypotheses 7a and 7b. The final set of hypotheses focused on the role of within-person
deviated levels of anxious and sexual arousal in moderating the association between individuallevel (i.e., between-person) rejection sensitivity and engaging in UAI. I conduct two models,
each testing one form of arousal (i.e., anxious or sexual) in predicting the trichotomous outcome
of the type of sex a participant engaged in on that day.
A note on variable centering and variance decomposition. I was explicitly interested in
examining both within-person processes and between-person differences, as this approach has
been applied infrequently in the literature to date (see Molenaar & Campbell, 2009 for a
discussion of this issue as well as Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003). I followed guidelines
proposed by Bolger and Laurenceau (2012) and Curran and Bauer (2011) to disaggregate the
daily measurement of affect into its between- and within-person components. This involved a
four step centering procedure: (1) the grand mean of the variable was calculated; (2) each
individual’s mean for the variable was calculated; (3) each individual’s mean for the variable
was subtracted from his daily measurement to create an individual-centered level of affect for
each day; and (4) the grand mean was subtracted from the individual average to create a grand
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mean-centered, between-person level measurement of affect. These two deviated scores are
considered to be relatively independent of each other and the between-person value can be used
as a level 2 predictor while the within-person value can be used as a level 1 predictor. The
between-person predictor indicates people who are generally more or less prone to a variable
(e.g., more prone to anxious arousal) than the average person in the dataset, while the withinperson predictor indicates within-person fluctuations within days on which people are
experiencing more or less positive and negative affect than their average day (e.g., a day on
which he is more anxiously aroused than usual). All other level 2 variables (i.e., condom-related
rejection sensitivity, safer sex self-efficacy) were turned into z-scores which achieved the benefit
of centering them at the grand mean as well as easing interpretability by putting them on
comparable scales (effects for which can be interpreted as the change in the odds of UAI for a
one standard deviation increase in the given predictor).
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Chapter 7: Descriptive Statistics and Psychometrics
In the following chapter, I begin by describing the demographic characteristics of the
analytic sample. I next provide details on how the analytic sample differs from the full study
sample as a whole, particularly as a result of retention in the project. Following these sections, I
provide information regarding the daily diary data, specifically focusing on completion rates, an
examination of reactivity, and confounding factors associated with engagement in UAI. Finally, I
end with psychometric analyses of the daily diary measures of anxious and sexual arousal and
the one-time CASI measure of condom-related rejection sensitivity.
Demographic Characteristics
Table 1 presents the demographic characteristics of the sample of 207 men included in
these analyses. As can be seen in the table, the sample was highly diverse with regards to
race/ethnicity, with more than half being men of color. The sample was nearly evenly split
between HIV-positive and HIV-negative men, with a slightly higher proportion of HIV-negative
men. A large majority of the sample was gay-identified as opposed to bisexual, and the sample
was relatively evenly split between currently being employed full-time or part-time or being
unemployed. A large majority of participants had at least some experience with post-secondary
education, and nearly one-quarter had some form of graduate-level education. Approximately
one-third of the men in the sample reported being in a relationship.
Study Enrollment
The model in Figure 7 displays the flow of participation from enrollment in the parent
project to inclusion in the analytic sample for this dissertation. As can be seen in the figure, a
total of 377 participants enrolled into the parent project. Of those, at the point at which data were
analyzed for this dissertation, 70 participants had not yet reached their 12-month window and
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thus had not returned for follow-up, and an additional 70 missed their opportunity to complete
the 12-month follow-up. The remaining 238 participants all completed the 12-month follow-up
and were thus eligible for inclusion in this dissertation study. However, due to technical errors,
seven of these participants had incomplete pre-12-month CASIs and were unable to complete
necessary measures (e.g., condom-related rejection sensitivity, safer sex self-efficacy). An
additional 24 participants opted not to participate in the 30-day diary cycle following the 12month appointment, and thus were unable to be included in analyses. As such, the final analytic
sample for this study is 207 highly sexually active gay and bisexual men who remained enrolled
in the parent project for the course of one year.
Diary Information
Of the 207 men included in this study, 14 were only partially finished with their 30-day
diary cycle at the time of analyses and, while included in analyses, are excluded from retention
calculations. Among the 193 participants who had the full opportunity to complete the 30-day
diary cycle, the average number of diary days per participant was 22.3 (74.3% average
completion) and the median was 26.0 (86.7% median completion). Figure 8 displays a histogram
which visually represents the number of days completed by participants. As can be seen, a
majority of participants completed a substantial portion of the 30-day cycle, though a minority of
participants completed very few days and thus skewed the average number of days towards the
middle range.
The next step was to examine potential behavioral reactivity to the daily diary whereby
the odds of UAI may change over the course of time. To do so, I fit a multilevel model with
diary day (i.e., 1 through 30) centered at 15 (i.e., 15 = 0) as the only predictor of UAI in the
model. Diary day was not associated with engaging in UAI with a casual partner (AOR = 1.00,
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95%CI[1.00, 1.00], p = 0.85). I examined the potential for nonlinear (i.e., quadratic, cubic)
effects of time on the odds of UAI and similarly found non-significant associations. I next
examined whether day of week, coded as dichotomous indicators of each day, was associated
with engagement in UAI. I conducted one model in which Sunday served as the referent and
another in which Monday served as the referent and found, across both models, only one
significant difference between Monday and Saturday (AOR = 0.54, 95%CI[0.33, 0.88], p <
0.05), suggesting that UAI was less common on Saturdays than Mondays. As a result of this
finding, I examined whether grouping weekend days together (i.e., Friday, Saturday, and
Sunday) might influence the odds of UAI. Although weekends had a higher odds of sex in
general, there was not a significant association between weekends and engagement in UAI (AOR
= 0.94, 95%CI[0.73, 1.21], p = 0.62). As such, no further models were adjusted for the effect of
time or day.
I next examined the influence of demographic variables on daily odds of engaging in
UAI. Specifically, I examined the role of race/ethnicity (white = 1, non-white = 0), HIV status
(positive = 1, negative = 0), sexual orientation (gay/queer = 1, bisexual = 0), and relationship
status (partnered = 1, single = 0). HIV-positive status (AOR = 4.81, 95%CI[2.99, 7.74], p <
0.001) was significantly associated with increased odds of UAI with casual partners and being
partnered (AOR = 0.51, 95%CI[0.32, 0.81], p < .01) was significantly associated with decreased
odds of UAI with a casual partner, while all others were non-significant. As such, all further
models were adjusted for the impact of HIV status and relationship status.
Measurement of Arousal
In order to disaggregate the daily measurements of anxious and sexual arousal into their
within-person (i.e., fluctuating) and between-person (i.e., dispositional) components, it is
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important to begin by confirming that the scale maintains the same structure at both levels
(Bryne, 2012). That is, it is important to confirm that anxious and sexual arousal are structurally
equivalent (i.e., can be measured in the same way) at both the within- and between-person levels.
Following guidelines by Byrne, I conducted multilevel confirmatory factor analysis in order to
confirm that the variance could be adequately partitioned to each level utilizing the same
structure, which would suggest that the same items could then be utilized to calculate both the
within-person and between-person scores.
Specifically, I fit a two-level, four-factor (i.e., four factors per level) multilevel model to
the data. Although the analyses for this dissertation focus exclusively on anxious and sexual
arousal, the full scale (which includes items for positive and negative arousal, as well) was
retained in the factor analyses. In doing so, I consulted modification indices to suggest potential
modifications to the model that might improve its fit. To maintain relevance to the present study,
I report exclusively on the results of the analyses that are relevant to the anxious and sexual
arousal subscales. The five items corresponding to anxious arousal (jittery, scared, afraid,
anxious, and nervous) and sexual arousal (sexually interested, sexually aroused, horny) were set
to load onto those factors in the original model, as displayed in Figure 9. Intraclass correlation
coefficients for each item, which indicate the proportion of the variance due to between-person
variation, ranged from 0.33 for the “sexually aroused” item to 0.53 for the “jittery” item,
suggesting that at least half of the variance resulted from fluctuations within individuals and it
was necessary to take into account the multilevel structure of the data.
The initial model suggested that there was strong residual correlation between items 4
and 5 (“scared” and “afraid”), and thus item 4 was removed from the model. Modification
indices also suggested that the “stressed” item loaded meaningfully onto the anxious arousal
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subscale, which is also conceptually meaningful, and thus this item was added to the anxious
arousal subscale at both levels. Finally, analyses revealed that the “jittery” item fit the anxious
arousal subscale poorly with a factor loading less than 0.50 at the within-person level, and as
such this item was removed. All three of the original sexual arousal items were retained for that
subscale. All fit indices for the final model structure shown in Figure 10, with the exception of
the chi-square statistic (which is known to be sensitive to large sample sizes; χ2(226) = 1118.94,
p < 0.001), demonstrated evidence of strong fit (RMSEA = 0.03, CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.94,
SRMRWithin = 0.04, SRMRBetween = 0.05). All further analyses relied on the modified composition
of the anxious arousal subscale and the original composition of the sexual arousal subscale.
Measurement of Condom-Related Rejection Sensitivity
Prior to using the newly developed condom-related rejection sensitivity scale, I
conducted a series of psychometric analyses to ensure its structure and reliability were
appropriate for analysis. I began by conducting a confirmatory factor analysis using the
combined anxiety-likelihood scores (i.e., the product of the anxiety and likelihood responses for
each item) for all seven items. As can be seen in Table 2, the initial model showed evidence of
misfit (i.e., the chi-square p-value was less than 0.05, the RMSEA was greater than 0.06, and the
CFI and TLI were less than 0.95). Although each factor loading was above typical thresholds,
three items stood out as being a poorer fit than the others based on both factor loadings and the
R2 explained by the model. Examining the item content, these were the only three items that
explicitly mentioned an overt discussion of non-condom use within the vignette (in contrast to
the participant’s perceptions regarding his partner’s desire for condom use), perhaps leading to
meaningfully different patterns of response than the other items. Indeed, removing these three
items from the scale substantially improved model fit, with all indices exceeding the standards
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for good model fit (i.e., non-significant chi-square p-value, RMSEA less than 0.06, CFI and TLI
greater than 0.95, and SRMR less than 0.06). The four retained items formed a scale that had a
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.91. Averaging the four anxiety-likelihood product scores together from
the four vignettes, the average score was 27.4 (SD = 26.7). The score obtained from the four
items from the final model are utilized throughout all further analyses.
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Chapter 8: Results of the First Aim
The first aim of this dissertation was to investigate a series of hypotheses regarding the
role of anxious and sexual arousal, behavioral control, and self-efficacy on the daily use of
condoms during anal sex with casual male partners. These hypotheses were developed to
advance a dual process model of sexual decision making that incorporated both the role of
System 1 (i.e., affect and arousal) and System 2 (i.e., behavioral control and self-efficacy)
processing. Furthermore, the hypotheses included the impact of both fluctuating, situational (i.e.,
within-person) processes and dispositional (i.e., between-person) traits. As mentioned
previously, all models were adjusted for the impact of HIV-positive status and relationship
status, which were significantly associated with engagement in UAI, and results are presented
only for comparisons between sex days without UAI and those with UAI, leaving out the
comparisons for days on which there was no sexual activity (although these were included in the
models).
Hypotheses 1a and 1b
Table 3 displays the results of analyses for Hypothesis 1a, in which I proposed that
within-person fluctuations in anxious arousal would be positively associated with engagement in
UAI, holding constant men’s dispositional tendencies towards anxious arousal. As can be seen,
neither within-person fluctuations in anxious arousal (AOR = 0.87, ns) nor dispositional
tendencies towards higher levels of anxious arousal (AOR = 1.39, ns) were significantly
associated with UAI.
Table 3 also displays the results of analyses for Hypothesis 1b, in which I proposed that
within-person fluctuations in sexual arousal would be positively associated with engagement in
UAI, holding constant men’s dispositional tendencies towards sexual arousal. As can be seen,
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within-person fluctuations in sexual arousal (AOR = 1.26, p = 0.03) were positively associated
with engagement in UAI, such that a one-unit increase in sexual arousal was associated with a
26% increase in the odds of UAI on a given day. Individual-level tendencies towards sexual
arousal (AOR = 1.11, ns) were unassociated with engagement in UAI.
Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c
Table 4 displays the results for Hypotheses 2a and 2b, in which I proposed that withinperson fluctuations in and individual-level dispositions toward a sense of control over sexual
behavior would be negatively associated with engagement in UAI. As can be seen, within-person
fluctuations in perceived behavioral control (AOR = 0.69, p = 0.001) were negatively associated
with engagement in UAI, such that a one-unit increase in behavioral control was associated with
a 31% decrease in the odds of UAI on a given day. However, contrary to Hypothesis 2b,
individual-level tendencies towards higher levels of behavioral control (AOR = 0.98, ns) were
unassociated with engagement in UAI.
Table 4 also displays the results for Hypothesis 2c, in which I proposed that individuallevel disposition towards higher levels of safer sex self-efficacy would be negatively associated
with engaging in UAI. As can be seen, when added to a model with the effects for within- and
between-person deviated perceived behavioral control, individual-level safer sex self-efficacy
(AOR = 0.53, p < 0.001) was negatively associated with engagement in UAI, such that a man
who was one standard deviation higher in self-efficacy than the average man in the sample had
47% lower odds of engaging in UAI on a given day. The addition of individual-level selfefficacy to the model also slightly reduced the impact of within-person fluctuations in perceived
behavioral control (AOR = 0.73, p = 0.004) on engagement in UAI.
Hypothesis 3
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The final hypothesis for the first aim was that within-person fluctuations in sexual arousal
and perceived behavioral control would interact to predict UAI, such that the negative
association between perceived behavioral control and UAI would be diminished by higher levels
of sexual arousal. As can be seen in Table 5, I found no evidence for an interaction between
within-person fluctuations in sexual arousal and perceived behavioral control (AOR = 0.99, ns)
and the main effect of within-person sexual arousal (AOR = 1.20, p = 0.11) on UAI was also
diminished to marginal significance (from the initial value that can be found in the result for
Hypothesis 1b in Table 3). Within-person perceived behavioral control (AOR = 0.66, p = 0.001)
was the only variable to maintain a significant and negative effect on UAI even after adjusting
for the impact of sexual arousal. Given that previous models have suggested that System 2 (i.e.,
perceived behavioral control) might mediate the association between System 1 (i.e., sexual
arousal) and UAI and given the reduction in the effect of sexual arousal on UAI when entered
simultaneously with perceived behavioral control, I next examined evidence for a mediational
pathway from sexual arousal to UAI through perceived behavioral control. Multilevel path
analyses revealed a significant negative effect of sexual arousal on perceived behavioral control
(B = -0.20, p < 0.001). Utilizing a model constraint whereby the indirect effect of sexual arousal
on UAI was fixed to zero, I found that this null hypothesis was rejected, suggesting a significant,
positive indirect effect of sexual arousal on UAI through perceived behavioral control, χ2(1) =
10.81, p = 0.001. These findings suggest that increases in sexual arousal lead to subsequent
decreases in perceived behavioral control which, in turn, lead to increases in the odds of UAI.
Aim 1 Discussion
The first aim of this dissertation was to investigate a dual process model of sexual
decision making in which the roles of anxious and sexual arousal were added to existing System
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2 components of commonly used models of sexual risk behavior such as safer sex self-efficacy
and perceived behavioral control. Taken together, these findings partially supported the inclusion
of System 1 variables in conceptualizations of sexual decision making for highly sexually active
gay and bisexual men. Specifically, although there were no significant findings for anxious
arousal, sexual arousal emerged as a statistically significant predictor of engagement in UAI.
Consistent with previous models that relied primarily on System 2 variables, results also showed
that perceived behavioral control and self-efficacy significantly reduced the odds of UAI on a
given day. Contrary to my hypothesis, sexual arousal and behavioral control, though each having
significant main effects, did not interact in their influence on UAI. A second test of whether or
not the influence of sexual arousal on UAI is mediated by perceived behavioral control was
found to be statistically significant. These findings suggest that, although sexual arousal does not
diminish the protective effect of perceived behavioral control on UAI, it can lead to reductions in
perceived behavioral control that subsequently increase the odds of UAI.
It is worth noting that none of the variables measured at the day-level (i.e., anxious
arousal, sexual arousal, and perceived behavioral control) had between-person level effects when
their variance was decomposed into both within- and between-person components. Although
sexual arousal and behavioral control both had significant effects as fluctuating, within-person
factors at the level of the day, between-person dispositions at the level of the individual did not
emerge as predictors of UAI. Between-person perceived behavioral control and safer sex selfefficacy were presumed to be highly related constructs, though self-efficacy emerged as a
statistically significant individual-level predictor of UAI while between-person deviated
behavioral control did not. In fact, in a post-hoc analysis performed to investigate their
similarity, I found that the two variables were very weakly correlated (r = 0.095, ns). These
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results may suggest that variables are best suited to answer questions on the level at which they
were measured. Specifically, when measured with regard to how one is feeling on a given day,
variables may be better suited for questions regarding within-person fluctuations in a construct
whereas those that are measured with regard to how one generally feels may be better suited for
questions regarding individual differences.
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Chapter 9: Results of the Second Aim
The second aim of this dissertation was to investigate a series of hypotheses regarding the
role of rejection sensitivity within the dual process model of sexual decision making. These
hypotheses were developed to advance an understanding of sexual risk behavior that takes into
account the social context in which sexual decisions are made. Furthermore, these hypotheses
were designed to investigate a specific social psychological construct that may influence the dual
processes examined within the first aim. As mentioned previously, all models were adjusted for
the impact of HIV-positive status and relationship status, which were significantly associated
with engagement in UAI, and results are presented only for comparisons between sex days
without UAI and those with UAI, leaving out the comparisons for days on which there was no
sexual activity (although these were included in the models).
Hypothesis 4
The fourth hypothesis was that condom-related rejection sensitivity (measured at the
individual level) would be positively associated with engagement in UAI, such that those men
with higher levels of rejection sensitivity would have higher odds of engaging in UAI on a given
day. As can be seen in Table 6, condom-related rejection sensitivity (AOR = 1.56, p < 0.001)
was significantly and positively associated with UAI, such that a man who was one standard
deviation higher than average on rejection sensitivity had 56% higher odds of engaging in UAI
on a given day.
Hypotheses 5a and 5b
Table 7 displays the results of Hypothesis 5a, in which I proposed that condom-related
rejection sensitivity would be positively associated with increases in daily levels of anxious
arousal. As can be seen, there was a significant and positive association between condom-related
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rejection sensitivity (B = 0.07, p = 0.04) and anxious arousal, such that men with higher levels of
rejection sensitivity also had higher levels of anxiety on an average day.
Table 7 also displays the results for Hypothesis 5b, in which I proposed that the
previously demonstrated positive association between condom-related rejection sensitivity and
daily anxious arousal would be strongest on days when men engage in anal sex with a casual
male partner (i.e., there would be an interaction between rejection sensitivity and a dichotomous
indicator of whether or not men engaged in anal sex in predicting daily levels of anxious
arousal). In the full model, there remained a significant main effect of condom-related rejection
sensitivity (B = 0.08, p = 0.03), a non-significant main effect of whether or not men had anal sex
with a causal partner (B = -0.03, ns), and a marginally significant interaction effect between the
two (B = -0.03, p = 0.065). The marginally significant interaction is plotted in Figure 11 and
suggests that, contrary to the hypothesized association, men who were higher in rejection
sensitivity experienced lower levels of anxiety on anal sex days than on non-anal sex days.
Hypothesis 6
Table 8 displays the results for the sixth hypothesis, in which I proposed that
dispositional (i.e., individual) levels of self-efficacy for condom use and condom-related
rejection sensitivity would interact to predict UAI, such that condom-related rejection sensitivity
would diminish the magnitude of the negative association between self-efficacy and UAI. As can
be seen, significant main effects for both self-efficacy (AOR = 0.55, p < 0.001) and rejection
sensitivity (AOR = 1.48, p < 0.001) were maintained and there was a statistically significant
interaction between the two (AOR = 1.25, p = 0.03). This interaction is plotted in Figure 12 and
confirms the hypothesis that, for individuals higher in condom-related rejection sensitivity, selfefficacy had less of a protective effective against UAI.
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Hypotheses 7a and 7b
In the final two hypotheses, I proposed that condom-related rejection sensitivity would
interact with daily levels of anxious and sexual arousal to increase their positive associations
with UAI. Results for both models are displayed in Table 9. In the model for anxious arousal, the
main effects of daily fluctuations in anxious arousal (AOR = 0.94, ns) and dispositional (i.e.,
individual) tendencies towards anxious arousal (AOR = 1.21, ns) remained non-significant and
the main effect for condom-related rejection sensitivity (AOR = 1.53, p < 0.001) remained
significant, as they had in prior models. There was a non-significant interaction (AOR = 0.75, ns)
between individual-level rejection sensitivity and within-person fluctuations in anxious arousal.
In the model for sexual arousal, the main effect of daily fluctuations in sexual arousal
(AOR = 1.28, p = 0.03) was significant, the main effect of dispositional (i.e., individual)
tendencies towards sexual arousal (AOR = 0.88, ns) was non-significant, and the main effect of
condom-related rejection sensitivity (AOR = 1.47, p = 0.01) was significant. Consistent with the
hypothesized association, there was a significant, positive interaction between individual-level
rejection sensitivity and within-person fluctuations in sexual arousal (AOR = 1.25, p = 0.02),
which is plotted in Figure 13. As can be seen, for men who were higher in rejection sensitivity,
higher levels of sexual arousal than on an average day were associated with increased odds of
UAI. Put another way, the impact of rejection sensitivity was negligible on days when men were
less sexually aroused than usual and was pronounced on days when they were more sexually
aroused than usual.
Aim 2 Discussion
The second aim of this dissertation was to extend the findings from the first aim utilizing
a dual process model of sexual decision making and to investigate the extent to which rejection
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sensitivity might be extended to the domain of condom use as a dispositional trait that influences
cognitive-affective processing and UAI. Indeed, analyses demonstrated a significant and positive
association between the newly developed condom-related rejection sensitivity scale and
engagement in UAI. The next step was to investigate the mechanisms through which rejection
sensitivity might act to increase the odds of UAI. In the first set of analyses, I tested a model and
found support for the notion that individuals who are higher on condom-related rejection
sensitivity have higher odds of UAI and also have higher levels of anxious arousal on a given
day. Contrary to hypotheses in which I expected this to be particularly true on days in which a
decision regarding condom use must be made (i.e., days on which participants had anal sex with
a casual partner), results revealed that men who were highly sensitive to rejection actually had
lower levels of anxious arousal on anal sex days than on non-anal sex days. This unforeseen
association can be explained in several ways, one of which is that these individuals ultimately
felt release from anxiety after having sex, potentially as a result of resolving their conflicting
rejection sensitivity by avoiding rejection and achieving pleasurable sex (either by not wearing a
condom or by wearing one but ultimately not being rejected as a result). Two other competing
hypotheses must also be mentioned. First, this specific sample of highly sexually active men may
find sex to be a form of stress relief, and this may be particularly true for those with high
condom-related rejection sensitivity. Second, a reversal of the causal hypothesis might actually
be the case, whereby men high in rejection sensitivity find sexual activity to be too stressful to
engage in on days on which they are already experiencing higher than usual levels of anxiety.
The second mechanism I tested was that rejection sensitivity would not only act directly
on engagement in UAI but also work to diminish the impact of a previously found variable that
strongly reduces engagement in UAI—safer sex self-efficacy. Analyses confirmed the
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hypothesis that rejection sensitivity and self-efficacy do interact in their association with UAI.
Specifically, both maintained their opposite independent effects, but for those who were higher
in rejection sensitivity, the impact of self-efficacy was diminished to almost nothing (i.e., those
with high self-efficacy were nearly identical to those with low self-efficacy if they were high in
rejection sensitivity). These findings suggest that one mechanism through which rejection
sensitivity may act on UAI in addition to a direct effect is through its weakening of otherwise
strong buffers against engagement in UAI.
In the final set of analyses, I sought to determine whether rejection sensitivity also
predisposed men towards System 1 processing and, in doing so, further increased their odds of
UAI beyond what would be expected by having high levels of rejection sensitivity alone. To do
so, I tested for a cross-level interaction between rejection sensitivity and two forms of arousal—
anxious and sexual. Consistent with results from analyses conducted for the first aim, findings
regarding anxious arousal were non-significant. However, hypotheses regarding the interaction
of condom-related rejection sensitivity and sexual arousal were confirmed. Specifically, both
higher levels of sexual arousal on a given day and being an individual with higher than average
levels of rejection sensitivity were significantly associated with increases in the odds of UAI.
Moreover, for those who were both high in rejection sensitivity and experiencing greater levels
of sexual arousal than they did on a typical day, the impact of each was strengthened. That is, on
days when men were more sexually aroused than their average day, those who were high in
rejection sensitivity had an increase in their odds of UAI relative to those lower in rejection
sensitivity. These findings suggest that another mechanism through which rejection sensitivity
acts to increase the odds of UAI is through a synergistic relationship with sexual arousal.
Specifically, this association provides support for the notion of decisional myopia whereby men
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become hyperfocused on the sexual situation, partner(s), or behaviors (as a result of heightened
arousal and focus on immediate interpersonal consequences of condom use) and are unable to
focus on potential future consequences such as HIV transmission.
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Chapter 10: Discussion
Literature on dual processes in decision making (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Evans,
2011; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2007; Slovic et al., 2005; Zajonc, 1980b, 1984) and
social psychological models of cognitive-affective processing (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999;
Mischel & Shoda, 1995) suggest that behavioral decision making is guided by two simultaneous
processes—Systems 1 and 2. Despite widespread recognition of these dual processes, the
literature on sexual decision making has relied almost exclusively on the more deliberate,
effortful, goal-focused, cognitive thinking characteristic of System 2 (Albarracín et al., 2005),
leaving out the potential role for both affective-based System 1 processing and traits which might
predispose individuals toward such processing, such as rejection sensitivity (Downey &
Feldman, 1996). As such, the two primary aims of this dissertation were to elaborate and test a
dual process model of sexual decision making for gay and bisexual men and to examine the
extent to which rejection sensitivity could be extended to a behavioral phenomenon (i.e., condom
use) and investigate potential mechanisms of its association with UAI.
To accomplish these aims, I utilized data from a larger, longitudinal project of highly
sexually active gay and bisexual men which included both one-time CASI surveys and a 30-day
online daily diary of affect and sexual behavior. I conducted a series of multilevel models with
engagement in UAI as the primary outcome to test these aims. Further, I decomposed the
variance of all daily measurements (i.e., anxious arousal, sexual arousal, perceived behavioral
control) into their within-person and between-person components to examine the impact of these
variables at both levels of analysis. Throughout the models, I examined a variety of hypotheses
regarding both main and interaction effects of key variables—anxious arousal, sexual arousal,
perceived behavioral control, safer sex self-efficacy, and condom-related rejection sensitivity.
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Across all models, I adjusted for the significant role of HIV status and relationship status to
remove their confounding effects.
Results of these dissertation analyses supported seven of my 12 hypotheses. Anxious
arousal was the only variable for which no hypotheses regarding its association with UAI were
supported. The first set of hypotheses predicted that within-person deviated anxious and sexual
arousal would be positively associated with engagement in UAI and the second hypothesis
regarding sexual arousal was supported by the results. Within the second set of hypotheses, I
predicted that within-person deviated perceived behavioral control, between-person deviated
perceived behavioral control, and individual-level (i.e., between-person) safer sex self-efficacy
would all be negatively associated with engagement in UAI. Results supported the associations
between within-person perceived behavioral control and individual-level safer sex self-efficacy
but did not support the hypothesis regarding between-person behavioral control. In the third
hypothesis I proposed that within-person deviated sexual arousal and perceived behavioral
control would interact to predict UAI, which was not supported by results. Results did, however,
reveal that perceived behavioral control mediated the association between sexual arousal and
UAI, suggesting that sexual arousal leads people to perceive themselves as less in control of their
sexual behavior which subsequently increases their odds of UAI.
In the fourth hypothesis—the first of the second aim—I predicted that individual-level
condom-related rejection sensitivity would be positively associated with engagement in UAI,
which was confirmed. The fifth set of hypotheses had to do with the role of rejection sensitivity
in predicting daily levels of anxious arousal. Specifically, I predicted a significant and positive
main effect such that higher rejection sensitivity would be associated with higher odds of UAI
and this was supported by results. I also predicted that rejection sensitivity would be associated
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with anxious arousal and would interact with a dichotomous indicator of whether or not the
participant had any anal sex with a casual partner to predict anxious arousal, such that those who
were higher in rejection sensitivity would experience greater anxious arousal on anal sex days
when they must make a decision about condom use than on non-anal sex days. Despite a
marginally significant finding, the effect was found to be in the opposite direction, such that
individuals higher in rejection sensitivity experienced lower anxious arousal on anal sex days
than on non-anal sex days. This finding may also suggest a reversed causal pathway, such that
men who are high in rejection sensitivity find sex to be too much of a stressor and thus do not
engage in sex on days in which they are already anxious. For the sixth hypothesis I proposed that
individual-level condom-related rejection sensitivity and safer sex self-efficacy would interact
such that the protective effect of self-efficacy on UAI would be diminished for those with higher
levels of rejection sensitivity—this hypothesis was supported. In the final set of hypotheses, I
proposed that individual-level rejection sensitivity would interact with within-person deviated
anxious and sexual arousal such that individuals with higher rejection sensitivity would have a
stronger association between arousal and UAI. As mentioned previously, the hypothesis
regarding anxious arousal was not supported, though the hypothesis regarding sexual arousal was
confirmed by analyses.
Taken together, these findings speak to several different themes within the literature—the
role of System 1 processing in decision making, the importance of examining both within-person
processes and between-person differences in decision making, and the role of rejection
sensitivity as one form of cognitive-affective processing that can disrupt behavioral intentions
and impair functioning during interpersonal decision making. Specifically, these findings point
to the importance of considering the role of sexual arousal within existing models of sexual
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decision making, the need to take into account fluctuations in psychological processes rather than
assuming a constant influence over time, and the relevance of rejection sensitivity not only in
typical interpersonal situations but also those that require interpersonal negotiation, such as
condom use. These findings provide new theoretical insights into a phenomenon I have referred
to as decisional myopia—the extent to which processes occurring in the “heat of the moment”
cause individuals to lose sight of their long-term intentions and future consequences in favor of
acting in the moment to achieve short-term sexual and interpersonal goals and reduce similar
consequences. Furthermore, these findings have meaningful implications for present efforts
towards behavioral HIV prevention. In the sections that follow, I describe each of these themes
in more detail.
Dual Processes and Sexual Decision Making
The first aim of this dissertation was to elaborate a dual process model of sexual decision
making that could take into account both System 1 (i.e., “hot,” affective) and System 2 (i.e.,
“cool,” cognitive) processing to provide a more holistic view of the decision making process. In
doing so, I tested two different forms of arousal that could be considered to be “hot” or
affectively-laden components of System 1—anxious and sexual arousal. The literature on the
role of affect and arousal in decision making often spoke generally about these processes (e.g.,
the primacy of affect, the affect heuristic, somatic marker hypothesis, and risk as feelings
hypothesis; Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2007; Zajonc, 1980b, 1984),
and as such, I made consistent hypotheses regarding both forms of arousal. These hypotheses
included a direct role of arousal on increasing sexual risk behavior (i.e., UAI) and interactions
between arousal and cognitive processes (i.e., perceived behavioral control and self-efficacy).
However, findings regarding these two forms of arousal were inconsistent with one another—

93
anxious arousal was unrelated to sexual risk behavior and hypotheses regarding its role in
decision making were not supported, whereas sexual arousal was strongly and consistently
related to sexual risk and hypotheses regarding its role were largely confirmed.
The lack of association found between anxious arousal and sexual risk behavior appears
to echo the mixed findings by Crepaz and Marks (2001) in their meta-analysis on the association
between negative mood—including anxiety—and sexual risk behavior. I initially echoed
concerns raised by Kalichman and Weinhardt (2001) that a reliance on global assessments of
mood (e.g., “climate”) rather than fluctuating affect (e.g., “weather”) and the use of crosssectional assessments were likely to be driving factors behind their findings. However, the
present study utilized both fluctuating levels of and individual-level dispositions towards anxious
arousal within a longitudinal daily diary and found similarly non-significant effects. The findings
of the present study stand in contrast to similar diary studies among gay and bisexual men
mentioned previously. For example, Mustanski (2007) utilized a nearly identical approach and
found that within-person fluctuations in anxious arousal were associated with increased levels of
sexual risk whereas between-person dispositions towards anxious arousal were unrelated to risk.
Though these findings may simply suggest that anxious arousal is not particularly
relevant to the sexual risk behavior of gay and bisexual men, other potential explanations are
worth mentioning. First, Mustanski (2007) relied on separate measures of within- and betweenperson anxious arousal whereby individuals reported in a cross-sectional measure on their
general tendencies towards anxious arousal and separately on a daily basis regarding how they
felt that day. As I discuss further within the later section on within- and between-person
processes, these two forms of measurement may produce results that are distinct from the
disaggregation of daily measurements. The second possibile explanation is that there may be
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significant variation in the association between anxious arousal and sexual risk and the questions
of for whom (i.e., moderators) and why (i.e., mediators) these associations exist and do not exist
were not sufficiently examined within the present analyses. Indeed, a post-hoc examination of
the random variation in the association between anxious arousal and UAI (not shown) revealed
significant within-person variation in the effect. Moreover, studies to date have tended to focus
generally on gay and bisexual men, whereas the current study foucsed on a very specific sample
of gay and bisexual men engaging in 2-3 times the average amount of sexual behavior compared
with other gay and bisexual men. As such, the sample had considerably higher levels of HIVpositive serostatus, reported significantly greater problems with controlling their sexual behavior,
and are likely to have at least slightly distinct profiles of sexual decision making compared with
more standard samples of gay and bisexual. The current results suggest that additional research is
needed into the potential association between anxious arousal and sexual risk behavior that takes
into acccount the issues of measurement, within- and between-person distinctions, the
mechanissms of the association, and issues of sampling.
The significant findings regarding sexual arousal were consistent with much of the
existing experimental and observational research conducted regarding its association with sexual
risk behavior. Previous studies found a significant direct effect of sexual arousal on increased
levels of sexual risk behavior in experimental research (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Blanton &
Gerrard, 1997) as well as the diary methodology by Mustanski (2007) previously discussed. In
the present study, I sought to examine whether the influence of arousal could operate
simultaneously with cognitive processes as dual process theories would suggest, but did not find
support for the notion that the two do operate independently of one another. Specifically, the
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impact of sexual arousal on UAI was reduced to non-significance when entered simultaneously
with perceived behavioral control.
I further sought to test whether System 1 processes might thwart System 2 processes by
reducing their overall impact on behavior as suggested by the risk as feelings hypothesis
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). To do so, I tested for an interaction between sexual arousal and
perceived behavioral control and found no evidence in support of this hypothesis. This finding
stands in contrast to theories regarding affective interference in rational decision making (e.g.,
Loewenstein, 1996). However, analyses did reveal that sexual arousal acted indirectly on UAI by
decreasing men’s perceptions that they were in control of their sexual behavior. It is important to
note the distinctions between this hypothesis and the moderation hypothesis. The moderation
hypothesis would have suggested that sexual arousal reduces the effectiveness of perceived
behavioral control in preventing UAI. That is, perceived behavioral control is effective on its
own but this effectiveness decreases in the face of arousal. Contrary to this hypothesis, the
mediational hypothesis suggests that perceived behavioral control maintains its significant
protective effect against UAI in the face of sexual arousal, but that sexual arousal reduces
perceived behavioral control itself, thus acting upon UAI indirectly. This finding challenges
theories suggesting that System 2 has the ability to cognitively control the more “wild” System 1
and provides evidence of the opposite—that System 1 can change the operation of System 2 by
feeding it with affectively-tagged information that is used in making cost-benefit decisions (e.g.,
Finucane et al., 2000). These findings highlight the important role that sexual arousal plays in
sexual decision making processes, and demonstrate the importance of considering visceral and
affective influences alongside cognitive predictors of decision making in models of sexual risk
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behavior. Doing so may have meaningful implications for HIV prevention, which I discuss in
more detail below.
Condom-Related Rejection Sensitivity and Sexual Decision Making
The second aim of this dissertation was to examine the extent to which individual
dispositions toward interpersonal functioning—specifically rejection sensitivity—could be
applied to sexual decision making and to investigate potential mechanisms of its association.
Preliminary results revealed that four items of the newly created condom-related rejection
sensitivity scale loaded well onto a single factor with good model fit and high internal
consistency. Although rejection sensitivity has been applied to general interpersonal functioning
(Ayduk et al., 2000; Downey & Feldman, 1996; Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998)
and functioning as a result of a stigmatized quality such as sexual orientation (Pachankis et al.,
2008) or race (Chan & Mendoza-Denton, 2008; Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, &
Pietrzak, 2002), this study was the first I am aware of that attempted to apply rejection sensitivity
to a behavioral domain (i.e., condom use). As such, I first sought out to establish its relevance to
condom use and found, as hypothesized, that individuals with higher levels of condom-related
rejection sensitivity also have higher levels of non-condom use. Furthermore, I demonstrated that
men higher in rejection sensitivity were also higher in anxious arousal on a given day, though
they had lower anxiety on days in which they engaged in anal sex than days when they did not,
contrary to my hypothesis. While these findings demonstrated the relevance of the rejection
sensitivity construct to sexual decision making, I further sought to examine the mechanisms
through which rejection sensitivity might act to increase sexual risk, particularly within the dual
process framework investigated within the first aim.
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Utilizing the cognitive-affective personality system and later theories inspired by it
(Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Mischel & Shoda, 1995), including rejection sensitivity, I proposed
that rejection sensitivity may be a trait that causes individuals to shift focus from long-term
intentions and goals to short-term priorities. Within the context of sexual behavior, I
hypothesized that this would occur as a result of shifting focus from long-term health-protective
behaviors (i.e., condom use) to short-term protection from being rejected and desire for sexual
fulfillment. To examine this, I examined two moderating associations—first, that rejection
sensitivity would moderate the association between safer sex self-efficacy and UAI; and, second,
that fluctuations in sexual arousal would moderate the association between rejection sensitivity
and UAI.
The first of these hypotheses, that self-efficacy and rejection sensitivity would interact to
predict UAI, was supported. Not only was there a significant interaction between the two, both
also maintained significant and opposite effects on UAI (i.e., rejection sensitivity was associated
with increases in UAI while self-efficacy was associated with decreases in UAI). For participants
who were high in self-efficacy, higher levels of condom-related rejection sensitivity significantly
diminished the protective effect of self-efficacy. In fact, for those low in rejection sensitivity, the
impact of having low self-efficacy versus high self-efficacy translated into nearly a 45%
reduction in the probability of UAI on a given day compared to less than a 19% reduction for
those high in rejection sensitivity. These findings highlight the first mechanism through which
rejection sensitivity appears to act on UAI. Namely, fear of sexual rejection interferes with one’s
ability to otherwise act efficaciously with regards to condom use. These findings are consistent
with the proposition by Downey and Feldman (1996) that rejection sensitivity manifests itself
through hypervigilance for rejection, placing a high priority on rejection avoidance, and thus
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engaging in behaviors that may be incongruent with the level or type of threat. In fact, these
findings suggest that the importance of avoiding rejection may be so strong that interpersonal
protection (i.e., rejection avoidance) may become more motivating than health protection (i.e.,
condom use).
The second hypothesis regarding the moderating role of sexual arousal on the association
between rejection sensitivity and sexual risk behavior was also supported. As hypothesized, I
found that that the risk-enhancing effect of sexual arousal on engaging in UAI was stronger for
participants high in rejection sensitivity than those low in rejection sensitivity. In fact, results
revealed that sexual arousal had a negligible effect on behavior among those who were low in
rejection sensitivity, whereas being higher in sexual arousal on a given day increased the
probability of UAI by nearly 30% for those with high rejection sensitivity. These findings
suggest that rejection sensitivity is a trait that can enhance sensitivity to System 1 processes such
as arousal, leading them to more strongly dominate decision making processes. One potential
mechanism for this association, as previously mentioned, is that rejection sensitivity leads
individuals to focus less on long-term intentions such as health-protective behaviors and focus
more on immediate behaviors such as rejection avoidance (as suggested by the previously
mentioned hypothesis) and sexual fulfillment (as suggested by the current hypothesis). Taken
together, these findings suggest that, in addition to the SCT-based predictors of sexual risk that
have been established in the literature (e.g., Albarracín et al., 2005; Albarracín et al., 2001),
social psychologists might also consider investigating the role of interpersonal sensitivity in
models of sexual decision making.
Within-Person and Between-Person Processes
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Building upon previous research on the interaction of personality and situational
processes (e.g., Mischel & Shoda, 1995), there has recently been a call for an investigation of
differing levels of influence (i.e., within-person versus between-person) on sexual behavior
(Cooper, 2010). Such an analysis would not only provide meaningful theoretical insights into the
levels at which behavior is influenced (e.g., structural, individual, situational/contextual, etc.), it
would also improve upon the ability to develop prevention strategies and interventions that are
appropriately designed to target behavior at the most impactful level. Across both of the aims of
this dissertation, I sought to simultaneously examine and compare the effects of within-person
fluctuations in and more stable between-person dispositions toward psychological phenomena.
To do so, I employed two separate approaches. First, I disaggregated daily measurements into
their constituent within- and between-person effects using techniques in variance decomposition
Second, I included important theoretical variables at both levels and examined them
simultaneously within models, often examining cross-level interactions as well. The results of
this dissertation suggest that there is meaning at both levels.
Sexual arousal and perceived behavioral control—both measured at the daily level—had
significant impact on sexual risk behavior when examining their within-person variation but not
their between-person dispositions when both levels of influence were entered simultaneously and
adjusted for one another. On the other hand, both variables measured at the individual level—
self-efficacy and rejection sensitivity—had significant associations with UAI. There are two
potential explanations for these findings that can be offered. The first is that variables work best
at the level on which they are measured. Variables measured at the within-person level, even
when decomposed into a more dispositional-level variable as well, may better capture withinperson fluctuation and thus serve as better predictors at that level. Importantly, a post-hoc
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analysis revealed that the between-person deviated measurement of perceived behavioral control
was uncorrelated with the individual-level measurement of safer sex self-efficacy, despite their
apparent similarity. It is worth noting that using the daily measurements without decomposing
them into different levels would likely produce differing results, as the two are considered to be
relatively independent of one another and the interpretation changes when looked at together.
Another potential hypothesis is that within-person fluctuation is the more meaningful of the two
levels—at least with the variables used in the present study—and the between-person level was
only significant for those variables for which a within-person component was not simultaneously
entered. These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, nor are they the only two potential
explanations. However, this study highlights the importance of continued research—both in
social psychology more generally as well as in sexual decision making, specifically—regarding
the relative contribution of within- and between-person processes. Dispositional traits may carry
more or less salience across situations, and thus it is important to better understand the extent to
which they are accessible across time. As such, future studies might examine the extent to which
presumed dispositions such as self-efficacy and rejection sensitivity might fluctuate from day-today and across situations by including daily measures of them in future diary research.
Theoretical Implications: Decisional Myopia
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to examine a model of sexual decision
making that could help to answer the question, “Why do people who seem predisposed to risk
avoidance engage in HIV risk behavior?” This question is critical to the next generation of HIV
prevention techniques, as more than three decades of research and prevention have now
demonstrated that, while increases in self-efficacy, behavioral skills, and intentions to engage in
safer sex can decrease risk behavior, even people with the highest levels of these cognitive-
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behavioral traits often cannot maintain 100% condom use (Albarracín et al., 2001). In attempting
to provide a preliminary answer to this question, I hypothesized that one of the mechanisms
through which people may ultimately fail to act upon their intentions is that, in the moment,
other processes get in the way. I referred to this phenomenon as decisional myopia—a process
whereby decision making shifts from one’s strongly held long-term goals and intentions to more
proximal and salient short-term pursuits.
The results of this dissertation provide preliminary support for the notion that, when
making sexual decisions, the process of myopia can occur through at least four different
mechanisms. First, high levels of sexual arousal appear to increase the focus on achieving
immediate pleasure at the expense of focusing on the potential future health consequences. In
this case, sexual arousal may take primacy over decision making and lead to short-term goals
consistent with arousal such as pleasure-seeking (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006). Second, sexual
arousal may undermine individuals’ sense of control in the sexual situation, thus leading to
reductions in the protective effect of behavioral control against UAI. Third, traits such as
rejection sensitivity may lead to added outcomes and consequences to be weighed. For example,
for a man high in rejection sensitivity, one consequence of condom use may still be HIV
transmission but a second may be the pain or humiliation of rejection by his sexual partner
(whereas it may only be the former for a man low in rejection sensitivity). In this case, myopia
occurs as a result of a dispositional trait leading one to focus on more proximal, salient, and
affectively-laden consequences than more distant, seemingly unlikely, and detached outcomes
(Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Finally, these situational and personality variables may interact in
their effect on decision making as suggested in the cognitive-affective personality system
(Mischel & Shoda, 1995). In this case, myopia is likely to occur as a result of both increased
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focus on the positive short-term goals consistent with the affective or aroused state as well as the
negative short-term consequences of the otherwise “rational” or health-protective behavior (i.e.,
condom use).
Implication for HIV Prevention
The findings of this dissertation have several implications for HIV prevention research
and practice. The primary implication is that sexual decision making results from the interplay of
both rational decision making such as intentions and planning as well as social, interpersonal,
and emotional processes. As previous research has acknowledged, sexual behavior is an
inherently interpersonal pursuit and one that has consequences beyond health and HIV. Sexual
behavior is often an expression of intimacy, an act of negotiation, and an experience of
vulnerability (e.g., Golub, Starks, Payton, & Parsons, 2011). Furthermore, sexual decisions are
often challenging to make within the moment and potentially lead to experiences of mixed
feelings and conflict (e.g., Wells et al., 2011). The results of this dissertation build upon previous
research by acknowledging that, in the “heat of the moment,” condoms are often not the first
priority. Rather, people may be struggling with fears that their partner will reject them or will be
sexually disappointed if they make the “wrong” decision. Future research is needed to continue
to integrate variables into models of sexual decision making that acknowledge the realities of sex
for those engaging in it. Prevention practice would do well to acknowledge these realities—in
addition to efficacious models that work on increasing intentions to engage in safer sex and selfefficacy for engaging in safer sex (e.g., Montaño & Kasprzyk, 2002), intervention techniques
aimed at increasing affect regulation or managing interpersonal sensitivity may improve efforts
to reduce HIV transmission risk behaviors. While these findings suggest that increases in selfefficacy may act to partially buffer against the negative effects of rejection sensitivity on UAI,
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those which target rejection sensitivity directly or, importantly, in unison with increases in selfefficacy, may have the largest effect.
Such techniques likely include cognitive-behavioral methods such as cognitive
restructuring, exposure, and assertiveness training might be used. Cognitive restructuring and
exposure have been demonstrated to reduce social phobia, a disorder that shares features in
combination with the hypervigilance and anxiety characteristic of rejection sensitivity (Mattick,
Peters, & Clarke, 1990). Moreover, research links rejection sensitivity to a lack of assertiveness
(Pachankis et al., 2008), which is directly relevant to the context of condom negotiation practices
and may be practically similar to self-efficacy. Therapeutic approaches that combine cognitive
restructuring, exposure, and assertiveness training with others aimed at increasing emotion
regulation, such as the Unified Protocol (Allen, McHugh, & Barlow, 2008; Ellard, Fairholme,
Boisseau, Farchione, & Barlow, 2010; Wilamowska et al., 2010), have recently been
demonstrated to be efficacious in preliminary trials and are currently being adapted and tested for
their ability to deal with the specific needs of gay and bisexual men (Pachankis, in press).
The finding that perceived behavioral control and sexual arousal do not interact but rather
that perceived behavioral control mediates the association between sexual arousal and UAI
provides another important implication for prevention. The impact of sexual arousal on
perceived behavioral control that leads to individual beliefs that behavior is out of one’s control
when highly sexually aroused might be challenged as part of an HIV prevention intervention.
The current findings suggest that, while higher levels of sexual arousal are associated with
increases in risk, this does not impact the effectiveness of behavioral control in simultaneously
reducing risk. Given that perceived behavioral control mediates this association, there is no
direct association between arousal and UAI that needs to be challenged. Rather, breaking the
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cognitive cascade that goes from increased sexual arousal to decreased feelings of control alone
could have a direct impact on UAI. As such, intervention techniques aimed at increasing
perceptions of behavioral control and reducing potentially maladaptive beliefs that sexual arousal
undermines one’s self-control and self-efficacy may have significant impacts on sexual risk
behavior.
In addition to therapeutic techniques aimed at reducing the cognitive-affective
antecedents of risk identified in this study, these findings also suggest that the use of biomedical
prevention strategies may be warranted. Specifically, HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) has
been demonstrated efficacious in reducing the risk of HIV transmission among men who have
sex with men (Singh et al., 2012). The current findings suggest that, even among men with high
intentions to engage in HIV-preventive behaviors, the sexual context may undermine their selfefficacy and lead to inconsistent condom use. Although condom use requires volitional control
and interpersonal negotiation during the sexual situation, taking PrEP on a daily basis within a
non-sexually charged situation may be effective in preempting the loss of control and fear of
interpersonal rejection that can result within sexual situations by providing an additional method
of protection should condom use not be possible or desirable. In fact, the current study suggests
that men who have desires to use condoms (i.e., those with higher self-efficacy) but find
themselves unable to in a consistent fashion (i.e., those with higher rejection sensitivity, or
anyone in a highly sexually arousing situation) may be ideal targets for PrEP. Specifically, these
men have the motivation to prevent HIV that is likely to be necessary to adhere to a PrEP
regimen while also having a need for its preventive impact. Moreover, given their higher-thanaverage levels of sexual activity, this sample of men may benefit more substantially from the
additional protection of PrEP, may represent a group for whom PrEP may more significantly
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reduce the concurrent transmission of HIV, and thus may be a group for whom PrEP is highly
cost-effective. Additional research is warranted that examines the utility of PrEP for such men.
Limitations
The results of this study should be considered in light of their limitations. As is common
in research with gay and bisexual men, this study relied on a convenience sample that was
recruited in New York City and all engaged in above-average levels of sexual behavior at
baseline. As such, the findings of this study are unlikely to generalize to general populations of
gay and bisexual men and may also be unique to those who are more sexually active. The sample
included in this dissertation study were also those who not only agreed to participate in the study,
but also returned for longitudinal follow-up appointments and completed all the required
components of the study including online CASI surveys from home and a 30-day daily diary.
Men in monogamous relationships, young men, men without access to the internet, and men
living outside of large urban centers who were not included in the present sample may show
different patterns of associations with regard to their sexual decision making and behavior.
Nonetheless, the sample used for the current study contains men who are likely to be at the
highest risk for HIV transmission and thus represents a critical population within which to
understand these associations. Future research is needed to determine the extent to which level of
risk (or perception of risk) may be an important mediating or moderating variable in models of
decision making.
Missing data present one of the largest difficulties in daily diary research. As described in
Chapter 7, participants were missing 7.7 days of data, on average, and the median completion
was 26 days. Given that the diary was comprised of a 30-day cycle, ample data were available
for analysis with these completion rates. However, it remains unknown what data were missed
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on the days when participants did not complete a diary. Specifically, it is possible that for some
participants, the days on which they had the most sex or engaged in the most UAI were the days
that presented the largest challenge in terms of completing the diary. As such, the data are
limited to the extent that missed days may be biased towards sex days. However, this concern
was at least partially dealt with by focusing the analyses only on the days on which a participant
had sex, thereby reducing the potential confound that would otherwise be present if comparing
days of UAI to all other possible days.
The multinomial logistic model limited the type of data structure that could be analyzed.
Although the clustering within individuals was accounted for by virtue of the multilevel model,
potential autocorrelation in the data was impossible to take into account. However, this concern
was partially alleviated by the fact that the outcome was not associated with any of the different
conceptualizations of time examined within Chapter 7. Further, while autocorrelation is common
with continuous outcomes (e.g., mood tends to be relatively stable and increase or decline
gradually over time), it is likely to be less common with categorical outcomes and particularly
sexual behavior (i.e., engaging in UAI on one day is unlikely to be strongly related to whether or
not an individual engages in UAI on the next day). Further investigation into the potential for
autocorrelation in sexual behavior is needed.
Although the current study was designed to extend existing models to take into account a
more complete picture of sexual situations (i.e., arousal, rejection sensitivity), the model was
nonetheless incomplete. For example, the current study focused generally on “casual” partners—
those with whom the participant did not consider himself to be in a primary, romantic
relationship. However, there is wide variety within the definition of casual partners as to a
participants’ familiarity with, knowledge of, and desire for the partner. Future research is needed
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that takes into account the role of partner-level variables such as perceived HIV status,
anonymity (or regularity) of their sexual encounter(s), and psychological variables such as trust
and intimacy. Furthermore, the role of context was largely unexplored in the current study,
though variables such as concurrent substance use or venue in which the behavior occurred (e.g.,
one’s apartment versus a sex party or bathhouse) are likely to influence both the predictors (i.e.,
arousal) and outcomes (i.e., UAI) in the current study.
Finally, the order of the data collection complicated the interpretation of the results.
Specifically, the measures of affect, though assessed first in the diary, were still retrospective
over the course of the day. Participants were not instructed to think about how they were feeling
before engaging in sexual behavior but rather how they felt throughout the day as a whole. As
such, it is possible that some of the effects, although a causal ordering was implied, are actually
the result of a reverse process. For example, some men may have felt more sexually aroused as a
result of engaging in UAI rather than engaging in UAI because they felt more sexually aroused.
In line with Bem’s (1967) self-perception theory, participants may have observed their behavior
(e.g., UAI) and inferred their affective and cognitive state at the time (e.g., high sexual arousal,
low behavioral control) as a result of the behavior. Future research is needed to improve upon the
ability to infer causal associations by assessing affect at a fixed point during the day (i.e.,
ecological momentary assessment) and separately assessing sexual behavior as a recall measure
at the end of the day (i.e., daily diary).
Conclusions
This study provided support for the utility of a dual process theory for the investigation of
sexual decision making, whereby the role of automatic, affective, and somatic processes are
considered simultaneously with traditionally-used conscious, cognitive, and rational processes.
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Further, this study demonstrated for the first time that the construct of rejection sensitivity can be
meaningfully applied to behaviors in addition to personal traits, and provided preliminary
evidence that condom-related rejection sensitivity is a valid and useful construct for
consideration within existing models of sexual decision making and HIV risk behavior. I found
that both within-person processes and between-person differences act simultaneously to
influence sexual behavior, and that interactions between the two may provide meaningful new
insights into sexual decision making. Finally, the results of this study suggested that models of
sexual decision making should consider the ways in which decision making might be interrupted
by a shift in focus from long-term to short-term outcomes as a result of dispositional traits such
as rejection sensitivity and fluctuating processes such as sexual arousal. Future research should
continue to examine the utility of dual process models among gay and bisexual men as well as
other populations, taking into account the interpersonal, physical, and emotional nature of sexual
behavior.

109
Appendix: Condom-Related Rejection Sensitivity Scale
Instructions: Please read the following descriptions of situations and answer the questions that follow
each one. Imagine each situation as vividly as you can, as if you were actually there.

1. Imagine that you are talking with a new guy online who you want to hook up with. He asks
you if you prefer to play safe or raw.
How concerned/anxious would you be that he would not want to have sex with you if you
said you only play safe?
Very
Unconcerned
1

2

3

4

5

Very
Concerned
6

How likely is it that he would not want to have sex with you if you said you only play
safe?
Very Unlikely
1

2

3

4

5

Very Likely
6

2. Imagine that you met a new guy at a bar or club one night and now you’re about to have sex
with him.
How concerned/anxious would you be that he would not want to have sex with you if you
pulled out a condom?
Very
Unconcerned
1

2

3

4

5

Very
Concerned
6

How likely is it that he would not want to have sex with you if you pulled out a condom?
Very Unlikely
1

2

3

4

5

Very Likely
6

3. Imagine that you have been dating a guy for a few weeks now. You are about to have sex and
he suggests not using a condom.
How concerned/anxious would you be that he would not want to have sex with you
insisted on using a condom?
Very
Unconcerned
1

2

3

4

5

Very
Concerned
6

How likely is it that he would not want to continue dating you if you insisted on using a
condom?
Very Unlikely
1

2

3

4

5

Very Likely
6

4. Imagine that one of your friends introduces you to a new guy who he thinks you would like.
After meeting, the two of you are really attracted to each other. You go back to his place and
are about to have sex.
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How concerned/anxious would you be that he would lose interest in you if you brought
up the subject of condoms?
Very
Unconcerned
1

2

3

4

5

Very
Concerned
6

How likely is it that he would lose interest in you if you brought up the subject of
condoms?
Very Unlikely
1

2

3

4

5

Very Likely
6

5. Imagine that you and a close friend are hanging out and he starts to get drunk and is flirting
with you. The two of you start to hook up and he says he wants to fuck.
How concerned/anxious would you be that he would be annoyed or upset if you insisted
on using a condom with him?
Very
Unconcerned
1

2

3

4

5

Very
Concerned
6

How likely is it that he would be annoyed or upset if you insisted on using a condom with
him?
Very Unlikely
1

2

3

4

5

Very Likely
6

6. Imagine that you randomly run into an ex-boyfriend who you haven’t seen in a while and
make plans to get together. The night goes really well and you are reminded of how great the
sex used to be with him. The two of you decide to go back to his place and are about to have
sex.
How concerned/anxious would you be that he would be annoyed or upset if you insisted
on using a condom with him?
Very
Unconcerned
1

2

3

4

5

Very
Concerned
6

How likely is it that he would be annoyed or upset with you if you insisted on using a
condom?
Very Unlikely
1

2

3

4

5

Very Likely
6

7. Imagine that you just met a really hot guy who you think might be a different HIV status than
you. As the two of you begin to fool around, he suggests the two of you fuck raw.
How concerned/anxious would you be that he would not want to have sex with you if you
insisted on using a condom?
Very
Unconcerned
1

2

3

4

5

Very
Concerned
6
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How likely is it that he would not want to have sex with you if you insisted on using a
condom?
Very Unlikely
1

2

3

4

5

Very Likely
6
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Tables 1 through 9
Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of the Study Sample
Variable
Race/Ethnicity
Black
Latino
White
Asian/Native Haw./Pac. Islander
Multiracial/Other
HIV Status
Negative
Positive
Sexual Orientation
Gay, queer, or homosexual
Bisexual
Employment Status
Full-time
Part-time
Unemployed
Highest Educational Attainment
High school diploma, GED, or less
Some college or Associate's degree
Bachelor's or other 4-year degree
Graduate degree
Relationship Status
Single
Partnered

Age (Range: 19 - 74; Median = 37)
Note. N = 207.

n

%

43
34
100
7
23

20.8
16.4
48.3
3.4
11.1

115
92

55.6
44.4

188
19

90.8
9.2

82
53
72

39.6
25.6
34.8

27
61
69
50

13.0
29.5
33.3
24.2

141
66

68.1
31.9

M
38.5

SD
11.9

0.13

0.16

1.28

0.11

1.09

1.21

0.13

1.23

0.14

χ2 p-value < 0.001
RMSEA/SRMR 0.156/0.056
CFI/TLI 0.919/0.879

6. Imagine that you randomly run into an ex-boyfriend who you
haven't seen in a while and make plans to get together. The night
goes really well and you are reminded of how great the sex used
to be with him. The two of you decide to go back to his place and
are about to have sex.
7. Imagine that you just met a really hot guy who you think
might be a different HIV status than you. As the two of you
begin to fool around, he suggests the two of you fuck raw.

4. Imagine that one of your friends introduces you to a new guy
who he thinks you would like. After meeting, the two of you are
really attracted to each other. You go back to his place and are
about to have sex.
5. Imagine that you and a close friend are hanging out and he
starts to get drunk and is flirting with you. The two of you start to
hook up and he says he wants to fuck.

1.18

3. Imagine that you have been dating a guy for a few weeks now.
You are about to have sex and he suggests not using a condom.

0.11

0.00

1.00
1.05

S.E.

Unstd.

2. Imagine that you met a new guy at a bar or club one night and
now you're about to have sex with him.

Item
1. Imagine you are talking with a new guy online who you want
to hook up with. He asks if you prefer to play safe or raw.

0.64

0.84

0.85

0.88

0.66

0.78

0.62

Std.

Initial Model
2

0.41

0.70

0.73

0.77

0.44

0.61

0.39

R

Results of the Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Condom-Related Rejection Sensitivity Scale

Table 2

--

0.09

0.08

0.09

--

0.00

--

S.E.

0.207
0.053/0.010
0.998/0.994

--

1.15

1.09

1.22

--

1.00

--

Unstd.

--

0.82

0.88

0.90

--

0.77

--

Std.

Final Model

--

0.68

0.77

0.80

--

0.59

--

R2

113

113

4.59
0.50
1.39

1.52
-0.68
0.33

1.19

Random Effects
Intercept Variance
0.85

2.97
0.32
0.88

0.38
0.62

Note. AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio. CI = Confidence Interval.

--

0.58
0.87

-0.55
-0.13

Fixed Effects
Level 1 (within-person)
Intercept
Arousal
Level 2 (between-person)
HIV-Positive Status
Partnered
Arousal

B

1.65

7.11
0.80
2.19

0.89
1.23

Model 1: Hypothesis 1a
(Anxious Arousal)
95% CI
AOR Lower Upper

< 0.001

< 0.001
0.004
0.153

0.014
0.442

p

1.24

1.48
-0.68
0.10

-0.71
0.24

B

Results of the Multilevel Models with Anxious Arousal and Sexual Arousal Predicting UAI.

Table 3

--

4.38
0.51
1.11

0.49
1.26

0.90

2.81
0.32
0.74

0.31
1.02

1.72

6.84
0.81
1.66

0.78
1.56

Model 2: Hypothesis 1b
(Sexual Arousal)
95% CI
AOR Lower Upper

< 0.001

< 0.001
0.005
0.616

0.002
0.031

p

114

114

4.41
0.50
0.98
--

1.49
-0.69
-0.02
--

1.24

Random Effects
Intercept Variance
0.89

2.82
0.31
0.64
--

0.33
0.56

Note. AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio. CI = Confidence Interval.

--

0.51
0.69

-0.67
-0.36

Fixed Effects
Level 1 (within-person)
Intercept
Perceived Behavioral Control
Level 2 (between-person)
HIV-Positive Status
Partnered
Perceived Behavioral Control
Safer Sex Self-Efficacy

1.71

6.90
0.80
1.50
--

0.80
0.86

< 0.001

< 0.001
0.004
0.916
--

0.004
0.001

Model 1: Hypotheses 2a and 2b
95% CI
B
AOR Lower Upper
p

1.06

1.06
-0.59
0.03
-0.64

-0.85
-0.31

B

--

2.89
0.56
1.03
0.53

0.43
0.73

0.75

1.84
0.35
0.68
0.42

0.27
0.59

1.50

4.56
0.88
1.56
0.67

0.66
0.90

Model 2: Hypothesis 2c
95% CI
AOR Lower Upper

Results of the Multilevel Model with Perceived Behavioral Control and Self-Efficacy Predicting UAI

Table 4

< 0.001

< 0.001
0.012
0.901
< 0.001

< 0.001
0.004

p

115

115

116
Table 5
Results of the Multilevel Model with an Interaction Between Sexual Arousal and Perceived
Behavioral Control in Predicting UAI

Fixed Effects
Level 1 (within-person)
Intercept
Sexual Arousal
Perceived Behavioral Control
Sexual Arousal × Perceived
Behavioral Control
Level 2 (between-person)
HIV-Positive Status
Partnered
Sexual Arousal
Perceived Behavioral Control
Random Effects
Intercept Variance

95% CI
Lower Upper

p

B

AOR

-0.78
0.19
-0.41
-0.01

0.46
1.20
0.66
0.99

0.29
0.96
0.51
0.73

0.73
1.51
0.85
1.35

1.48
-0.68
0.09
0.01

4.38
0.51
1.09
1.01

2.77
0.31
0.69
0.62

6.93 < 0.001
0.82
0.006
1.72
0.712
1.64
0.974

1.28

--

0.92

1.77 < 0.001

Note. AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio. CI = Confidence Interval.

0.001
0.113
0.001
0.953
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Table 6
Results of the Multilevel Model with Condom-Related Rejection Sensitivity Predicting UAI

Fixed Effects
Level 1 (within-person)
Intercept
Level 2 (between-person)
HIV-Positive Status
Partnered
Condom-Related Rejection
Sensitivity
Random Effects
Intercept Variance

95% CI
Lower Upper

p

B

AOR

-0.77

0.46

0.30

0.72

1.16
-0.69

3.18
0.50

2.03
0.32

4.98 < 0.001
0.79
0.003

0.45

1.56

1.26

1.93 < 0.001

1.09

--

0.78

1.53 < 0.001

Note. AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio. CI = Confidence Interval.

0.001

0.21

Random Effects
Intercept Variance

0.00

0.07

0.26

--

0.14

-0.04
0.13

< 0.001

--

0.042

0.010
0.917

< 0.001
--

0.21

-0.03

0.08

-0.18
-0.01

1.64
-0.03

0.17

-0.06

0.01

-0.31
-0.15

1.54
-0.07

0.26

0.00

0.14

-0.04
0.13

1.74
0.01

< 0.001

0.065

0.025

0.009
0.916

< 0.001
0.202

Model 2: Hypothesis 5b
95% CI
B
Lower Upper
p

Note. Outcome of this model is anxious arousal conducted using a linear mixed model. CI = Confidence Interval.

0.17

--

-0.31
-0.15

-0.18
-0.01

--

1.54
--

1.64
--

1.73
--

Model 1: Hypothesis 5a
95% CI
B
Lower Upper
p

Fixed Effects
Level 1 (within-person)
Intercept
Anal Sex Day with Casual Partner
Level 2 (between-person)
HIV-Positive Status
Partnered
Condom-Related Rejection
Sensitivity
Cross-Level
Anal Sex Day with Casual Partner
× Condom-Related Rejection
Sensitivity

Anxious Arousal

Results of the Multilevel Model with Condom-Related Rejection Sensitivity, Engagement in Anal Sex, and their Interaction Predicting

Table 7
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118
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Table 8
Results of the Multilevel Model with an Interaction Between Condom-Related Rejection
Sensitivity and Safer Sex Self-Efficacy Predicting UAI

Fixed Effects
Level 1 (within-person)
Intercept
Level 2 (between-person)
HIV-Positive Status
Partnered
Condom-Related Rejection
Sensitivity
Safer Sex Self-Efficacy
Condom-Related Rejection
Sensitivity × Safer Sex SelfEfficacy
Random Effects
Intercept Variance

95% CI
Lower Upper

p

B

AOR

-0.95

0.39

0.25

0.60 < 0.001

0.77
-0.66

2.16
0.52

1.37
0.33

3.40
0.81

0.40
-0.60
0.23

1.48
0.55
1.25

1.20
0.44
1.02

1.84 < 0.001
0.69 < 0.001
1.55
0.034

0.95

--

0.69

1.30 < 0.001

Note. AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio. CI = Confidence Interval.

0.001
0.004

3.30
0.50
1.21
1.53

0.75

1.19
-0.69
0.19
0.42

-0.29

1.10

Random Effects
Intercept Variance

0.78

0.52

1.23

2.09
0.32
0.77

0.20
0.66

Note. AOR = Adjusted Odds Ratio. CI = Confidence Interval.

--

0.28
0.94

-1.27
-0.06

B

1.54

1.08

1.89

5.21
0.79
1.89

0.39
1.34

Model 1: Hypothesis 7a
(Anxious Arousal)
95% CI
AOR Lower Upper

Fixed Effects
Level 1 (within-person)
Intercept
Arousal
Level 2 (between-person)
HIV-Positive Status
Partnered
Arousal
Condom-Related Rejection
Sensitivity
Cross-Level
Arousal × Condom-Related
Rejection Sensitivity

UAI

< 0.001

0.121

< 0.001

< 0.001
0.003
0.415

< 0.001
0.737

p

1.22

0.23

0.39

1.13
-0.68
-0.13

-0.90
0.24

B

--

1.25

1.47

3.10
0.51
0.88

0.41
1.28

0.89

1.05

1.16

1.94
0.32
0.58

0.26
1.02

1.66

1.51

1.87

4.94
0.81
1.33

0.65
1.59

Model 2: Hypothesis 7b
(Sexual Arousal)
95% CI
AOR Lower Upper

< 0.001

0.015

0.001

< 0.001
0.005
0.536

< 0.001
0.031

p

Results of the Multilevel Models with Anxious/Sexual Arousal, Condom-Related Rejection Sensitivity, and their Interaction Predicting

Table 9
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Figures 1 through 13

Figure 1. Hypotheses 1a and 1b predict that within-person anxious and sexual arousal (System 1
processes) will each have positive main effects on UAI.

122

Figure 2. Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c predict that the main effects of behavioral control (at both
levels) and self-efficacy (System 2 processes) will have negative main effects on UAI.

123

Figure 3. Hypothesis 3 proposes that within-person sexual arousal (System 1) moderates the
association between within-person perceived behavioral control (System 2) and behavior (UAI)
and diminishes the overall negative impact of perceived behavioral control on UAI.

124

Figure 4. Hypotheses 5a and 5b suggest that rejection sensitivity leads to higher levels of
anxious arousal on a given day. Further, anxiety is higher on sex days than non-sex days, and
rejection sensitivity moderates this association such that individuals with higher rejection
sensitivity have a stronger association between sex and anxiety.

125

Figure 5. Hypothesis 6 proposes that rejection sensitivity will moderate the association between
self-efficacy and UAI, such that the protective effect of self-efficacy on UAI will be diminished
for individuals with high levels of rejection sensitivity.

126

Figure 6. Hypotheses 7a and 7b suggest that individuals high in rejection sensitivity will have a
higher positive association between anxious and sexual arousal and UAI.

127

Figure 7. The flowchart above specifies the composition of the sample used in this dissertation
as they exist within the larger parent project.

128

Figure 8. The histogram above shows the number of diary entries completed by participants out
of their 30-day cycles.

Figure 9. The figure above displays the original structure of the multilevel factor analysis of anxious and sexual arousal.

129
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Figure 10. The figure above displays the final structure of the multilevel factor analysis of anxious and sexual arousal.

130

130
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Figure 11. The figure above displays the interaction between condom-related rejection
sensitivity and anal sex with a casual partner in their impact on daily levels of anxious arousal.

132

Figure 12. The above figure displays the interaction between condom-related rejection
sensitivity and safer sex self-efficacy in their impact on the probability of engaging in UAI on a
given day.

133

Figure 13. The above figure displays the interaction between condom-related rejection
sensitivity and daily fluctuations in sexual arousal in their influence on the probability of
engaging in UAI on a given day.
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